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ABSTRACT
The US government has recently conducted large scale purchases of assets and implemented policies
that reduced the cost of funds to financial institutions. Arguably these policies have helped to correct
credit market dysfunctions, allowing interest rate spreads to shrink and output to begin a recovery.
We study four models of financial frictions which explore different channels by which these effects
might have occured. Recent events have sparked a renewed interest in leverage restrictions and the
consequences of bailouts of the creditors of banks with under-performing assets. We use two of our
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31. Introduction
1.1. Preliminary Observations
The recession that began in late 2007 poses new challenges for macroeconomic modeling.
Asset values collapsed, initially in housing and then in equity (see Figure 1a). In late
2008, interest rate spreads suddenly jumped to levels not seen in over 70 years (see Figure
1b).2 There was widespread concern among policymakers that ￿nancial markets had become
dysfunctional because of a deterioration in ￿nancial ￿rm balance sheets associated with the
fall in asset values.3 These concerns were reinforced by the dramatic fall in investment in
late 2008 (see Figure 1c), which suggested that a serious breakdown in the intermediation
sector might have occurred. The US Treasury and Federal Reserve (Fed) reacted forcefully.
The Fed￿ s actions had the e⁄ect of reducing the cost of funds to ￿nancial institutions. For
example, the Federal Funds rate was driven to zero (see Figure 1d) and the interest rate on
the three month commercial paper of ￿nancial ￿rms also fell sharply. In addition, the Fed
took a variety of unconventional actions by acquiring various kinds of ￿nancial claims on
￿nancial and non-￿nancial institutions. Standard macroeconomic models are silent on the
rationale and on the e⁄ects of the Fed￿ s unconventional monetary policies.
Still, there is casual evidence that suggests the Fed￿ s unconventional monetary policy
helped.4 The Fed began to purchase ￿nancial assets in late 2008 and ￿nancial ￿rm com-
mercial paper spreads dissipated quickly thereafter. In March 2009 the Fed expanded its
asset purchase program enormously and corporate bond spreads also began to come down
(Figure 1b). Soon, aggregate output began to recover and the National Bureau of Economic
Research declared an end to the recession in June, 2009 (Figure 1c). Of course, it is di¢ cult
to say what part of the recovery (if any) was due to the Fed￿ s policies, what part was due
to the tax and spending actions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
and what part simply re￿ ects the internal dynamics of the business cycle. Many observers
suppose that the Fed￿ s policies had at least some e⁄ect.
These observations raise challenging questions for macroeconomics:
￿ What are the mechanisms whereby a deterioration in ￿nancial ￿rm balance sheets
causes a drop in ￿nancial intermediation and a jump in interest rate spreads?
￿ How do reductions in interest rate costs for ￿nancial ￿rms and large scale government
asset purchases correct these ￿nancial market dysfunctions? What are the e⁄ects of
these actions on economic e¢ ciency?
The answers to these questions are important for determining which asset market program
should be undertaken and at what scale. Traditional macroeconomic models used in policy
2We examined monthly data on the interest rate on BAA and AAA rated bonds taken from the St. Louis
Federal Reserve bank website. In December, 2008 the interest rate spread on BAA over AAA bonds peaked
at 3.38 percent, at an annual rate. This is a higher spread than was observed in every month since 1933.
3The extent to which balance sheets became imparied was hard to assess because there did not exist clear
market values for many of the ￿nancial assets in the balance sheets of ￿nancial institutions.
4See, for example, Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2010). For a less sanguine perspective on the
e⁄ectiveness of the Fed￿ s policy, see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) and Taylor and Williams
(2009).
4analysis in central banks have little to say about these questions. Although our analysis is
primarily motivated by events in the US since 2007, the questions we ask have a renewed
urgency because of recent events in Europe. There is a concern that a collapse in the market
value of sovereign debt may, by damaging the balance sheets of ￿nancial ￿rms, plunge that
continent into a severe recession. Models are required that can be used to think about the
mechanisms by which such a scenario could unfold.
We survey the answers to questions raised in the two bullets above from the perspective
of four standard models borrowed from the banking literature and inserted into a general
equilibrium environment. In each case, we drastically simplify the model environment so
that we can focus sharply on the main ideas. Accordingly, the kind of details that are
required to ensure that models ￿t quarterly time series data well are left out. For example,
the models have only two periods, most shocks are left out of the analysis and we abstract
from such things as labor e⁄ort, capital utilization, habit persistence, nominal variables,
money, price and wage-setting frictions, etc. We also abstract from the distortionary e⁄ects
of seigniorage and the other mechanisms by which governments and central banks acquire
the purchasing power to ￿nance their acquisition of private assets. We abstract from these
complications by assuming revenues are raised with non-distorting, lump sum taxes. Finally,
we make assumptions that allow us to abstract from the e⁄ects of changes in the distribution
of income in the population. For the reasons described in section 2 below, it is important to
relax this assumption in more general analyses of unconventional monetary policy.
Ultimately, the questions raised above must be addressed in fully speci￿ed dynamic,
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Only then can we say with con￿dence which
of the ￿nancial frictions discussed below is quantitatively important. Similarly, we require a
DSGE model if we are to quantify the magnitude of the required policy interventions. Work
on the task of integrating ￿nancial frictions into DSGE models is well under way.5 Our
hope is that this paper may be useful in this enterprise by providing a bird￿ s eye view of the
qualitative properties of the di⁄erent models, in terms of their implications for the questions
raised above.
Our survey does not examine all models of ￿nancial frictions. For example, we do not
review models that can be used to think about the e⁄ects of government asset purchases on
a liquidity shortage (see, e.g., Moore (2009) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2008)).6 Instead, we
review models that are in the spirit of Mankiw (1986), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)
(BGG), Gertler and Karadi (2009) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) (GK2). We review four
models. The ￿rst two feature moral hazard problems and the third features adverse selection.
The fourth model features asymmetric information and monitoring costs. The latter model
resembles BGG closely, although we follow Nowobilski (2011) by assuming that the ￿nancial
5There is now a large literature devoted to constructing quantitative dynamic, stochastic general equilib-
rium models for evaluating the consequences of government asset purchase policies. For a partial list of this
work, see Ajello (2010), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Christiano,
Motto and Rostagno, (2003, 2010, 2011), Curdia and Woodford (2009), Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero and
Kiyotaki, (2010), Dib (2010), Fisher (1999), Gertler and Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), Hi-
rakata, Sudo and Ueda (2009a,2009b,2010), Liu, Wang and Zha (2010), Meh and Moran (2010), Nowobilski
(2011), Ueda (2009), Zeng (2011).
6The Moore and Kiyotaki and Moore ideas are pursued quantitatively in Ajello (2010), and Del Negro,
Eggertsson, Ferrero and Kiyotaki (2010).
5frictions apply to ￿nancial rather than non-￿nancial ￿rms.
Our models capture in di⁄erent ways the hypothesis that a drop in bank net worth caused
the rise in interest rate spreads and the fall in investment and intermediation that occurred
in 2007 and 2008.7 In our ￿rst two models, these e⁄ects involve the operation of fundamental
￿ nonlinearities￿ . In particular, in these models there is a threshold level of bank net worth,
such that when net worth falls below it, the equations that characterize equilibrium change.
The second two models involve nonlinearities in the sense that the equations characterizing
equilibrium are not linear. However, they are not characterized by the more fundamental
type of nonlinearity found in the ￿rst two models.
Where possible, we use our four models to investigate the consequences for economic
e¢ ciency of the following tax-￿nanced government interventions: (i) reductions in the cost
of funds to ￿nancial ￿rms, (ii) equity injections into ￿nancial ￿rms, (iii) loans to ￿nancial
and non￿nancial ￿rms, and (iv) transfers of net worth to ￿nancial ￿rms. Regarding (ii),
we de￿ne an equity injection as a tax-￿nanced transfer of funds to a bank in which all the
resulting pro￿ts are repaid to the government. In the case of (iii), we de￿ne a government
bank loan as a tax-￿nanced commitment of funds that must be repaid on the same terms as
those received by ordinary depositors.
All the models suggest that (i) helps to alleviate the dysfunctions triggered by a fall in
net worth, though the precise mechanisms through which this happens varies. There is less
agreement among the models in the case of (ii) and (iii). Whether these policies work depend
on the details of the ￿nancial frictions.
All the models suggest that (iv) helps. This is perhaps not surprising, since (iv) in e⁄ect
undoes what we assume to be the cause of the trouble. Still, this aspect of our analysis
is best viewed as incomplete, for at least two reasons. First, our models are silent on why
markets cannot achieve the transfer of net worth to ￿nancial ￿rms. Within the context
of the models, there is no fundamental reason why it is that when funds are transferred
to banks they must go in the form of credit and not net worth. We simply assume that
the quantity of net worth in ￿nancial ￿rms is ￿xed exogenously. We think there is some
empirical basis for the assumption that bank net worth is hard to adjust quickly in response
to a crisis, but whatever factors account for this observation should be incorporated into
a full evaluation of (iv).8 Second, policy (iv) entails a redistribution of wealth and income
among the population. Our models abstract from the e⁄ects of wealth redistribution.
Some policies are best analyzed in only a subset of our models. Examples of such policies
include leverage restrictions on banks, as well as a policy of bailing out the creditors of banks
experiencing losses on their portfolios. We study the ￿rst of these policies in only two of our
models, the ones in sections 4 and 6 below. We study creditor bailouts in section 4.
7By a ￿ bank￿we mean any institution that intermediates between borrowers and lenders.
8See footnote 10 below.
61.2. Overview of the Model Analysis
1.2.1. Moral Hazard I: ￿ Running Away￿Model
We ￿rst describe a simpli￿ed version of the analysis in GK2, which focuses on a particular
moral hazard problem in the ￿nancial sector.9 This problem stems from the fact that bankers
have the ability to abscond with a fraction of the assets they have under management. A
repeated version of the one period model that we study provides a crude articulation of the
post 2007 events. Before 2007, interest rate spreads were at their normal level (actually, zero
according to the model) and the ￿nancial system functioned smoothly in that the ￿rst-best
allocations were supported in equilibrium. Then with the collapse in banking net worth,
interest rate spreads jumped and ￿nancial markets became dysfunctional, in the sense that
the volume of intermediation and investment fell below their ￿rst-best levels.
According to the model, banks respond to the decline in their own net worth by restricting
the amount of deposits that they issue. Banks do so out of a fear that if they tried to
maintain the level of deposits in the face of the decline in their net worth, depositors would
lose con￿dence and take their money elsewhere.10 Depositors would do so in the (correct)
anticipation that a higher level of bank leverage would cause bankers to abscond with bank
assets. From this perspective, a sharp cut in the cost of funds to banks calms the fears of
depositors by raising bank pro￿ts and providing bankers with an incentive to continue doing
business normally.
In the case of direct equity injections and loans, we follow GK2 in assuming that the
government can prevent banks from absconding with government funds.11 Under these cir-
cumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that government equity injections and loans, (ii) and
(iii), are e⁄ective. With the government taking over a part of the economy￿ s intermediation
activity, the amount of intermediation handled by the banking system is reduced to levels
that can be handled e¢ ciently with the reduced level of banking net worth. Of course, if the
nature of the ￿nancial market frictions are not something that can be avoided by using the
government in this way, then one suspects (ii) and (iii) are less likely to be helpful. This is
the message of our second model.
1.2.2. Moral Hazard II: Unobserved Banker E⁄ort
Our second model captures moral hazard in banking in a di⁄erent way. We suppose that
bankers must exert a privately observed and costly e⁄ort to identify good investment projects.
The problem here is not that bankers may abscond with funds. Instead, it is that bankers may
exert too little e⁄ort to make sure that assets under management are invested wisely. Bankers
must be given an incentive to exert the e¢ cient amount of e⁄ort. One way to accomplish
this is for bank deposit rates to be independent of the performance of bank portfolios, so
9For other analyses in this spirit, see Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), and Meh and Moran (2010).
10The model (and others in this manuscript) assumes that banks cannot increase their net worth. The
model o⁄ers no explanation for this. The assumption does appear to be roughly consistent with observations.
In private communication, James McAndrews shared the results of his research with Tobias Adrian. That
work shows that bond issuance by ￿nancial ￿rms declined sharply in the recent crisis, while equity issuance
hardly rose.
11In addition, we assume that - unlike the bankers in the model - government employees do not have the
opportunity to abscond with tax revenues.
7that bankers receive the full marginal return from exerting extra e⁄ort. But, bankers must
have su¢ cient net worth of their own if the independence property of deposit rates is to be
feasible. This is because we assume that bankers cannot hold a perfectly diversi￿ed portfolio
of assets. As a result, bankers - even those that exert high e⁄ort - occasionally experience a
low return on their assets. For deposit rates to be independent of the performance of banker
portfolios, bankers with poorly performing portfolios must have su¢ cient net worth to pay
the return on their deposits. We show that when bankers have a su¢ ciently high level of net
worth, then bank deposit rates are independent of the performance of bank portfolios and
equilibrium supports the e¢ cient allocations.
Financial markets become dysfunctional when the banks whose assets perform poorly
have too little net worth to cover their losses. Depositors in such banks must in e⁄ect share
in the losses by receiving a low return. To be compensated for low returns from banks with
poor assets, depositors require a relatively high return from banks with good assets. But,
when deposit rates are linked to the performance of bank assets in this way, bankers have less
incentive to exert e⁄ort. Reduced e⁄ort by bankers pushes down the average return on bank
assets and, hence, deposit rates for savers. With lower deposit rates, household deposits -
and, hence, investment - are reduced below their e¢ cient levels.
Consider the implications for policy. Interest rate subsidies, policy (i), help by reducing
the cost of funds to banks. This policy reduces banks￿liabilities in the bad state and so
increases the likelihood that deposit rates can be decoupled from bank asset performance.
This result is of more general interest, because it con￿ icts with the widespread view that
interest rate subsidies to banks cause them to undertake excessive risk. In our environment,
an interest rate subsidy increases bankers￿incentive to undertake e⁄ort, leading to a rise in
the mean return on their portfolios and a corresponding reduction in variance. Interest rate
subsidies have this e⁄ect by raising the marginal return on banker e⁄ort.
Government equity injections and loans, policies (ii) and (iii), have no e⁄ect in the model.
Although the proof of this ￿nding involves details, the result is perhaps not surprising.
The government equity injections and bank loans that we consider do not o⁄er any special
opportunity to avoid ￿nancial frictions in the way that our ￿rst model of moral hazard does.
It is not obvious (at least, to us) what unique advantage the government has in performing
intermediation, when that activity involves a costly and hidden e⁄ort. Our hidden e⁄ort
model illustrates the general principle that the sources of moral hazard matter for whether
a particular government asset purchase program is e⁄ective.
Our hidden action model is well suited to studying the e⁄ects of leverage restrictions
and bailouts of creditors to banks with poorly performing assets. We have noted above that
when net worth is low, it may not be possible for deposit rates to be decoupled from the
performance of bank assets. Obviously, if the quantity of deposits were su¢ ciently low, then
deposit rates could be ￿xed and independent of bank asset performance even if net worth is
low. We show that when binding leverage restrictions are placed on banks when net worth
is low, social welfare is increased.
81.2.3. Adverse Selection
Our third model focuses on adverse selection as a source of ￿nancial market frictions.12 In
our model the portfolios of some banks are relatively risky in that these banks have a high
probability of not being able to repay their creditors. Banks have access to credit markets.
However, because bank creditors cannot assess a given bank￿ s riskiness, all banks must pay
the same interest rate for credit.13 This interest rate must be high enough to take into
account the bankers with high risk portfolios that are likely to not repay. As is the case
in adverse selection models, under these circumstances ￿ good￿bankers - those who could
potentially acquire low risk assets - ￿nd it optimal to not borrow at all. This re￿ ects the
fact that good bankers repay creditors with high probability, so that their expected pro￿ts
from borrowing and acquiring securities are low. When the net worth of bankers drops, the
adverse selection e⁄ect driving out good bankers becomes stronger.
Because the rise in the interest rate spread on credit to banks drives away potentially good
bankers, the quality of the assets on the balance sheet of banks seeking credit deteriorates.
The result is a decline in the overall return on bank assets and so a fall in the equilibrium
return on household saving. The reduction in saving in turn causes a fall in investment.
We show that this fall in investment corresponds to an increase in the gap between the
equilibrium level of investment and investment in the ￿rst-best equilibrium. In this sense,
the decline in banker net worth makes the banking system more dysfunctional. For these
reasons the adverse selection model formalizes a perspective on the ￿nancial events since
2007 that is similar to the one captured by the models in the previous two sections.
We consider the policy implications of the adverse selection model. A tax-￿nanced trans-
fer of net worth to bankers improves equilibrium outcomes. This is not surprising, since
an increase in banker net worth reduces banks￿dependence on external ￿nance and hence
reduces the adverse selection distortions. Government policies that have the e⁄ect of subsi-
dizing the cost of funds to bankers also improve equilibrium outcomes. The reason is that
they raise the return on saving received by households and have the e⁄ect of reducing the
gap between the equilibrium interest rate and the social return on loans.
1.2.4. Asymmetric Information and Monitoring Costs
Our fourth model of ￿nancial frictions focuses on asymmetric information and costly moni-
toring as the source of ￿nancial frictions. At this time, the costly state veri￿cation model is
perhaps the most widely used model of ￿nancial frictions in macroeconomics.14
12There are several analyses of the recent credit crisis that focus on adverse selection in credit
markets. See, for example, Chari, Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2010), Fishman and Parker (2010),
House (2006), Ikeda (2011a,b), Kurlat (2010). In addition, see also the argument in Shimer,
http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2008/09/case-against-paulson-plan.html. Eisfeldt (2004) presents a the-
oretical analysis that blends adverse selection and liquidity problems.
13In particular, equilibrium in the market for credit to banks is a pooling equilibrium. One reason why
equilibrium involves pooling is that the environment has the property that the quantity of funds that banks
must borrow is ￿xed.
14For a prominent example, see BGG. Another example is given by the Christiano, Motto and Rostagno
(2003, 2010, 2011) analysis of the US Great Depression and the past three decades of US and Euro Area
business cycles. An earlier DSGE model application of the costly state veri￿cation and costly monitoring
idea can be found in the in￿ uential contribution by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), as well as in Fuerst (1994).
9In the model, bankers combine their own net worth with loans to acquire the securities
of ￿rms with projects that are subject to idiosyncratic risk. We assume that a bank can
purchase the securities of at most one ￿rm, so that the asset side of bank balance sheets
is risky. There are no ￿nancial frictions between a bank and the ￿rm whose securities it
purchases. The realization of uncertainty in a ￿rm￿ s project is observed by its bank, but
can only be observed by bank creditors by paying a monitoring cost. We assume that
creditors o⁄er banks a ￿ standard debt contract￿ . The contract speci￿es a loan amount and
an interest rate. The bank repays the loan with interest, if it can. If the securities of a bank
are bad because the issuing ￿rm has an adverse idiosyncratic shock then the bank declares
bankruptcy, is monitored by its creditor and loses everything.15 Our characterization of the
2007 and 2008 crisis follows the line explored with our other models, by supposing that the
crisis was triggered by a fall in bank net worth. In addition, our model also allows us to
consider the idea that an increase in the cross-sectional dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks
played a role.16
Our environment is su¢ ciently simple that we obtain an analytic characterization of the
ine¢ ciency of equilibrium. We show that in the model the marginal social return on credit to
banks exceeds the average return, and it is the latter that is communicated to bank creditors
by the market. Lending to banks is ine¢ ciently low in the equilibrium because a planner
prefers that the credit decision be made based on the marginal return on loans. The problem
is exacerbated when the net worth of banks is low. Not surprisingly, we ￿nd that a policy
of subsidizing bank interest rate costs improves welfare. Also, the optimal subsidy is higher
when bank net worth is low. In addition, we study the e⁄ects of direct government loans to
banks, but ￿nd that this has no impact on the equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 below describes what we call
the Barro-Wallace irrelevance proposition, which sets out a basic challenge that any model
of government asset purchases must address. The following two sections describe the two
models of moral hazard. Section 5 studies the model of adverse selection. Second 6 studies
the model with asymmetric information and costly monitoring. A ￿nal section presents
concluding remarks.
For another contribution of this idea in a DSGE model, see Jonas Fisher￿ s 1994 Northwestern University
doctoral dissertation, published in Fisher (1999). Finally, see Williamson (1987).
15Herein lies a sharp distinction between the model analyzed here and the one in BGG. In BGG, the
asymmetric information and monitoring costs lie on the asset side of the bank balance, that is, between
the bank and the ￿rm to which it supplies funds. In addition, the bank is perfectly diversi￿ed across ￿rms
so that in BGG, banks are perfectly safe. Other modi￿cations of the BGG model that introduce risk in
banking include for example, Hirakata, Sudo and Ueda (2009a,2009b,2010), Nowobilski (2011), Ueda (2009),
and Zeng (2011).
16To our knowledge, the ￿rst papers to consider the economic e⁄ects of variations in microeconomic
uncertainty are Williamson (1987) and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003). More recently, this type
of shock has also been considered in Arellano, Bai and Kehoe (2010), Bigio (2011), Bloom (2009), Bloom,
Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2010), Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010, 2011), Ikeda (2011a,b), Jermann
and Quadrini (2010) and Kurlat (2010).
102. The Barro-Wallace Irrelevance Proposition
Any analysis of unconventional policy must confront a basic question. If the government
acquires privately issued assets by levying taxes (either in the present or the future), then
the ownership of the asset passes from private agents to the government which later reduces
households￿tax obligations as the asset bears fruit. The question any analysis of asset
purchases by the government has to answer why it makes a di⁄erence whether private agents
hold assets themselves or the government holds them on taxpayers￿behalf. In the simplest
economic settings, households￿intertemporal consumption opportunities are not a⁄ected by
government asset purchases, so that such purchases are irrelevant for allocations and prices.
We refer to this irrelevance result as the Barro-Wallace irrelevance proposition, because it is
closely related to the Ricardian equivalence result emphasized by Barro (1974) and extended
by Wallace (1981) to open market operations.17 Any analysis in which government asset
purchases have real e⁄ects must explain what assumptions have been made to defeat the
Barro-Wallace irrelevance result.
One way to defeat Barro-Wallace irrelevance builds on heterogeneity in the population.
For example, suppose that a subset of the population has a special desire to hold a certain
asset (for example, 30 year Treasury bonds). If the government engages in a tax ￿nanced
purchase of that bond, then in e⁄ect the bond is transferred from the subset of the population
that holds it initially, to all taxpayers. Such a redistribution of assets among heterogeneous
agents may change prices and allocations. This type of logic may be useful for interpreting
the recent substantial changes that have occurred in the Federal Reserve￿ s balance sheet.18
We do not pursue this line of analysis further here, since we abstract from changes in the
distribution of income in the population.
There are other ways in which tax ￿nanced purchases of private securities may have real
e⁄ects. In the examples we explore, this can happen by changing the market rate of interest.
3. Moral Hazard I: ￿ Running Away￿Model19
We construct a two-period model. In the ￿rst period, households make deposits in banks.
Bankers combine these deposits with their own net worth and provide funds to ￿rms. In
the second period, households purchase the goods produced by ￿rms using income generated
by bank pro￿ts and interest payments on bank deposits. The source of moral hazard is
that bankers have an option to default by absconding with an exogenously ￿xed fraction
of their total assets, leaving the rest to depositors. When a su¢ ciently large fraction of a
bank￿ s assets are purchased with bankers￿own net worth, then a bank simply hurts itself
by defaulting and it chooses not to do so. We show that, when the net worth of banks is
su¢ ciently large that the option to default is not relevant, then the equilibrium allocations
correspond to the ￿rst-best e¢ cient allocations. We refer to this scenario as a ￿ normal time￿ .
When banks￿net worth is su¢ ciently low, banks restrict the supply of deposits. Banks do
17What we are calling the Barro-Wallace irrelevance proposition is applied to government purchases of
long term debt in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
18The logic in the text may also provide the foundation for a theory of the e⁄ectiveness of sterilized
interventions in the foreign exchange markets.
19This section is based on joint work with Tao Zha.
11this because they know that if they planned a higher level of deposits, depositors would
rationally lose con￿dence and take their deposits elsewhere. With the supply of deposits
reduced in this way, and no change in demand, the market-clearing interest rate on deposits
is low. Because the return on bank assets is ￿xed by assumption, the result is an increase
in banks￿interest rate spreads.20 We refer to the situation in which bank net worth is so
low that the banking system is dysfunctional and conducts too little intermediation as a
￿ crisis time￿ . Thus, the model articulates one view about what happened in the past few
years: ￿a fall in housing prices and other assets caused a fall in bank net worth and initiated
a crisis. The banking system became dysfunctional as interest rate spreads increased and
intermediation and economic activity was reduced.￿In contemplating such a scenario we
imagine a version of our two-period model, repeated many times.
Government policy can push the economy out of crisis and back to normal by undoing
the underlying cause of the problem. One way the government can do this is by purchasing
bank assets. In the Gertler-Karadi and Gertler-Kiyotaki analysis it is assumed that the
government has the ability to prevent banks from absconding with bank assets ￿nanced by
equity or deposit liabilities to the government. We show that su¢ ciently large government
purchases of bank assets can restore the banking system to normal. In particular, government
asset purchases cause interest rate spreads to disappear and total intermediation to return
to its ￿rst best level. Interest rate spreads disappear because government-￿nanced purchases
of assets induce a fall in household demand for deposits. If the government purchases are
executed on a large enough scale, the fall in the demand for deposits is su¢ cient to push
the deposit interest rate back up to the e¢ cient level where it equals banks￿return on their
funds. The logic of the Barro-Wallace irrelevance result does not hold in a crisis time because
tax-￿nanced government purchases of bank assets have an impact on the interest rate.
Another policy that can resolve a crisis is one in which the government provides tax-
￿nanced loans to ￿rms. Under this policy the government returns the proceeds of its invest-
ment in ￿rms to households in the form of lower taxes in the second period. Households
understand that this government policy is a substitute for their bank deposits and so they
reduce the supply of deposits. With the supply and demand for bank deposits both reduced,
the deposit interest rate rises back up and the interest rate spread is wiped out. Total inter-
mediation returns to its normal level because, though household deposits are relatively low,
this is matched by a corresponding increase in government provision of funds. In this way,
tax-￿nanced loans to non￿nancial business can resolve a crisis.
Finally, we show that a policy of subsidizing banks￿cost of funds can push the economy
out of a crisis. Such a policy works by increasing banks￿pro￿ts during a crisis and so reducing
their temptation to abscond with bank assets. Understanding that their depositors are aware
of this, banks expand their deposits back to the ￿rst best level.
We ￿rst describe the model. We then formally establish the properties of government
policy just reviewed.
20So, pro￿ts per unit of bank deposits rise when banker net worth is low. However, total bank pro￿ts may
be low because of the lower net worth of the banks.
123.1. Model
There are many identical households, each with a unit measure of members. Some members
are ￿ bankers￿and others are ￿ workers￿ . There is perfect insurance inside households, so that
all household members consume the same amount,  in period 1 and  in period 2. In period
1, workers are endowed with  goods and the representative household makes a deposit, 
in a bank subject to its period 1 budget constraint:
 +  ￿ 
The representative household￿ s period 2 budget constraint is:
 ￿  + ￿
Here,  represents the gross return on deposits and ￿ denotes the pro￿ts brought home by
bankers. The household treats ￿ as lump sum transfers. The intertemporal budget constraint








The representative household chooses  and  to maximize
() + ￿() () =
1¬ 
1 ¬  
    0 (3.2)









  =  ¬   =  + ￿ (3.3)
We can see the basic logic of the Barro-Wallace irrelevance proposition from (3.1). Sup-
pose the government raises taxes,  in period 1, uses the proceeds to purchase  deposits
and gives households a tax cut, , in period 2. The periods 1 and 2 budget constraints are
replaced by:
 +  ￿  ¬   ￿  + ￿ +  (3.4)
Using these two equations to substitute out for  +  we obtain (3.1) and  is irrelevant
for the determination of  and  Deposits are determined residually by  =  ¬  If the
government increases , then  drops by the same amount. Of course, if we change the
environment in some way, then the Barro-Wallace irrelevance proposition may no longer be
true. This could happen, for example, if  a⁄ected . To investigate this, we need to ￿ esh
out the rest of the model.
Bankers in period 1 are endowed with  goods. They accept deposits from households
and purchase securities,  from ￿rms. Firms issue securities in order to ￿nance the capital
they use to produce consumption goods in period 2. Intermediation is crucial in this economy.
If ￿rms receive no resources from banks in period 1, then there can be no production, and
therefore no consumption, in period 2.
13We ￿rst consider the benchmark case in which there are no ￿nancial frictions and the
banking sector helps the economy to achieve the ￿rst best allocations. We suppose that
the gross rate of return on privately issued securities is technologically ￿xed at  Bankers
combine their own net worth,  with the deposits received,  to purchase  from ￿rms.
Firms use the proceeds from  to purchase an equal quantity of period 1 goods which they
turn into capital. The quantity of goods produced by ￿rms in period 2 using this capital
is . Goods producing ￿rms make no pro￿ts, so  is the revenue they pass back to









where  =  +  and  is the banker￿ s state.
An equilibrium is de￿ned as follows:
Benchmark Equilibrium: ￿ such that
(i) the household and ￿rm problems are solved
(ii) the bank problem, (3.5), is solved
(iii) markets for goods and deposits clear
(iii)   0
Condition (iii) indicates that we only consider interior equilibria, both here and elsewhere in
the paper. A property of a benchmark equilibrium is  =  To see this, suppose it were
not so. If    the bank would set  = 0 and if    the bank would set  = 1
neither of which is consistent with the equilibria that we study. Thus, in the benchmark
case the interest rate faced by households in equilibrium coincides with the actual rate of
return on capital. It is therefore not surprising that the ￿rst best allocations are achieved
in this version of the model. That is, the allocations in the e¢ cient, benchmark equilibrium
coincide with the allocations that solve the following planning problem:21
max

() + ￿() (3.6)
subject to:  +  ￿  +   ￿ 

The interest rate spread in this economy is de￿ned as  ¬ In the benchmark equilib-
rium the interest rate spread is zero. This makes sense, since there are no costs associated
with intermediation and there is no default. We summarize this result as follows:
Proposition 3.1. A benchmark equilibrium has the properties:
(i) the interest rate spread,  ¬  is zero
(ii)  takes on its ￿rst-best value.
In this economy, the Barro-Wallace irrelevance proposition is satis￿ed. Tax ￿nanced govern-
ment purchases of private assets have no impact.
We now introduce the moral hazard problem studied by Gertler-Karadi and Gertler-
Kiyotaki. A bank has two options: ￿ default￿and ￿ not default￿ . Not defaulting means that
21We assume the environment is such that   
14a bank simply does what it does in the benchmark version of the model. In this case, the
bank earns pro￿ts
￿ = 
 ( + ) ¬  (3.7)
The option to default means that the banker can take a fraction, ￿ of the assets and leave
whatever is left for the depositors. A defaulting bank receives ￿ ( + ) and its depositors
receive (1 ¬ ￿) ( + ) The bank chooses the no default option if, and only if doing so
increases its pro￿ts:
( + )
 ¬  ￿ ￿( + )
 (3.8)
By rearranging terms, we see that (3.8) is equivalent with
(1 ¬ ￿)( + )
 ￿  (3.9)
That is, a bank chooses the no default option if, and only if, doing so reduces what depositors
receive.
Each bank takes the interest rate on deposits as given, and sets its own level of deposits,
. Banks are required to post their intended values of  at the start of the period, so that
households can assess whether or not a bank will default. We consider symmetric equilibria
in which no bank chooses to default and the  posted by banks satisfy (3.8). In such an
equilibrium an individual bank has no incentive to choose a level of deposits that violates
(3.8) because depositors would in this case prefer to take their deposits to another bank,








 subject to (3.8). (3.10)
The de￿nition of equilibrium we use in the case that the banker has a default option is:
Financial Equilibrium: ￿ such that
(i) the household and ￿rm problems are solved
(ii) the bank problem, (3.10), is solved
(iii) markets for goods and deposits clear
(iii)   0
The di⁄erence between a ￿nancial equilibrium and a benchmark equilibrium lies in the
de￿nition of the banker problem.
When the bank￿ s incentive constraint, (3.8), is non-binding, then  =  and the no
default condition reduces to:

 ￿ ￿( + )

If  is su¢ ciently large, (3.8) is non-binding and the equilibrium has the property that  is
at its ￿rst-best level and the interest rate spread is zero.
Now suppose that  is su¢ ciently small (consider, for example, the case,  = 0) that
(3.8) strictly binds.22 In this case, the ￿nancial equilibrium would not be characterized
by  =  The only equilibrium is one in which  is below  To see why, note that
a reduction in  directly helps to restore (3.8) by increasing the term on the left of the
22That is, the multiplier on (3.8) in the Lagrangian representation of (3.10) is non-zero.
15inequality. In addition, the fall in  reduces  and this reduces both the left and right sides
of (3.8).23 We summarize this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2. When (3.8) is non-binding, the ￿nancial market equilibrium allocations
are ￿rst-best and the interest rate spread is zero. When (3.8) binds, then the equilibrium
values of  and  are below their ￿rst-best levels and the interest rate spread is positive.
A sequentially repeated version of this model economy provides a rough characterization
of events before and after 2007. Suppose that  was large in the early period, so that
the economy was operating at its e¢ cient level and no part of actual spreads was due to
the type of default considerations addressed here. Then, in late 2007 the net worth of
banks suddenly began to fall as a consequence of the collapse in housing prices. When the
participation constraint began to bind, spreads opened up. The volume of intermediation -
and the investment it supported - then collapsed.
3.2. Implications for Policy
We now consider the e⁄ects of four kinds of tax-￿nanced unconventional monetary policies:
injections of equity into banks, deposits in banks, direct loans to ￿rms and subsidies to
banks￿cost of funds. In each case, the policy is ￿nanced by lump sum taxes,  in the ￿rst
period. In the case of the asset purchase policies, the government transfers the proceeds
back to households in the form of a second period tax reduction.
3.2.1. Equity Injections into Banks
In the case of an equity injection, the government transfers  to each bank. The government
requires the banks to repay the earnings,  on the assets ￿nanced by the equity. The
government transfers the  back to households in period 2 in the form of a tax reduction.
We assume that unlike the household, the government has the power to prevent the bank
from absconding with any part of the assets ￿nanced by . Thus, for a bank that receives an
equity injection of , the incentive to default is still the object on the right of the inequality
in (3.8). An equity injection also has no impact on a bank￿ s pro￿ts:
( +  + )
 ¬  ¬ 
 = ( + )
 ¬ 
Thus, for a given level of deposits,  an equity injection has no e⁄ect on a bank￿ s deci-
sion to default. However, the government￿ s equity injection does a⁄ect the representative
household￿ s choice of .
To understand how the representative household responds to the tax implications of an
equity injection, a suitable adjustment of (3.3) implies:
 =









23Here, we use the fact that  is increasing in  To see this, substitute out for ￿ in (3.3) using (3.7) and





  + 
( + )
Evidently, equilibrium consumption is strictly decreasing in , so that  is strictly increasing in .
16Note that  does not directly cancel in the numerator because the rate of interest enjoyed
by the government when it does an equity injection is di⁄erent from the household￿ s rate
of return on deposits when (3.8) binds and  6=  To understand the general equilibrium
impact of  on  it is necessary to substitute out for ￿ (3.7):
 =










The household￿ s period 1 budget constraint implies  =  ¬  ¬  Using this to substitute





  + 
( + ) (3.11)
 =  ¬  ¬ 
Interestingly, the general equilibrium e⁄ect of  on consumption is nil, despite the di⁄erence
between the government￿ s and the household￿ s interest rate. From the latter expression, we
see that a rise in  has no impact on  and so it has a one-for-one negative impact on 
If (3.8) is non-binding, then the equity injection is irrelevant. There is no impact on total
intermediation,  +  and the interest rate spread remains unchanged at zero.
Now suppose that (3.8) is binding. The fall in  with a rise in  increases the right
side of (3.8) and reduces the left side, thus making the incentive constraint less binding.
With  large enough, the incentive constraint ceases to bind altogether and an analogous
argument to the one leading up to proposition 3.2 establishes that the interest rate spread
is eliminated,  =  while total intermediation,  +  achieves its ￿rst best level.
To see what level of  achieves the ￿rst-best, let ￿ denote the level of deposits in a
benchmark equilibrium (￿ can be found by solving (3.6) and setting ￿ =  ¬ ). Our
assumption that (3.8) is strictly binding implies that

  ￿( + 
￿)
so that ￿ is not part of a ￿nancial equilibrium. Set  to the value,  ￿ that solves

 = ￿( + 
￿ ¬ 
￿) (3.12)
We summarize the preceding results in the form of a proposition:
Proposition 3.3. When (3.8) is non-binding tax-￿nanced equity injections have no impact
on total intermediation, + and on the interest rate spread, ¬ When (3.8) binds, tax
￿nanced equity injections reduce the interest rate spread and increase total intermediation.
A su¢ ciently large injection restores spreads and total intermediation to their ￿rst-best level.
We can express the equations of the model in words as follows. When  falls enough, the
supply of deposits by banks decreases because the incentive constraint binds on the banks.
This creates an interest rate spread by reducing the deposit rate (recall, the return on assets
is ￿xed in this model). A tax-￿nanced government purchase of assets causes the demand
for deposits by households to decrease, pushing the deposit rate back up and reducing the
interest rate spread. The decrease in deposits is somewhat o⁄set by the rise in the deposit
rate and this is why  +  increases with the government intervention. The intervention is
welfare improving because it pushes the economy back up to the ￿rst best allocations.
173.2.2. Government Deposits in Banks and Loans to Firms
Suppose the government makes tax-￿nanced deposits,  in banks in period 1. In period 2
it returns the proceeds to households in the form of a tax cut in the amount,  It is easy
to verify that  and  are determined according to (3.11) in this case. As a result, total
deposits,  +  are invariant to  for a given 
If we assume that banks can as easily default on the government as on households, then
total deposits,  +  enter the incentive constraint and the tax-￿nanced deposits are irrel-
evant. However, suppose that the government can prevent banks from defaulting on any





 are not counted in the incentive constraint, (3.8). With only house-
hold deposits in the incentive constraint, the analysis is identical to the analysis of equity
injections.
Now consider the case where the government makes tax-￿nanced loans directly to ￿rms.
This case is formally identical to the case of tax-￿nanced equity injections. For a given
  +  is invariant to  However, because only  enters the incentive constraint, (3.8),
the reduction in  that occurs with a rise in  relaxes the incentive constraint in case it
is binding. This results in an increase in  and, hence, a rise in total intermediation. We
summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.4. If the government can prevent bank defaults on its own bank deposits,
then the e⁄ects of tax-￿nanced government deposits in banks resemble the e⁄ects of equity
injections summarized in proposition 3.3. Direct government loans to ￿rms have the same
e⁄ects as those of equity injections.
3.2.3. Interest Rate Subsidies and Net Worth Transfers to Banks
We now consider a policy in which the government subsidizes the interest rate that banks
pay on deposits. Suppose that the equilibrium is such that the incentive constraint, (3.8), is
binding. As in the previous subsection this implies that the ￿rst-best level of deposits (i.e.,




￿  ￿( + 
￿)
 (3.13)




 (1 ¬ ￿)
￿ = ￿( + 
￿)
 (3.14)
Note that there exists a unique value of ￿  0 that solves this equation because the left side
is increasing in ￿ and the left exceeds the right when ￿ = 1 To ￿nance the transfer, ￿￿
to banks the government levies taxes,  = ￿￿ on households in the second period. We
now verify that this policy, together with  = ￿  =  and ,  at their ￿rst-best levels,
￿￿, satis￿es all the equilibrium conditions. Bank pro￿ts in the second period are:
￿ = ( + 
￿)
 ¬ 
 (1 ¬ ￿)







Total household income is
 + ￿ ¬  = ( + 
￿)

18The latter result and the assumption that ￿￿ solve (3.6) imply that the household problem
is solved. The fact that the incentive constraint is satis￿ed implies that the bank problem,
(3.10), is solved. We summarize these ￿ndings as follows:
Proposition 3.5. Suppose (3.8) binds in equilibrium, so that deposits are strictly below
their ￿rst-best level in a ￿nancial equilibrium. Then, a subsidy to bank deposit liabilities at
the rate de￿ned by (3.14) ensures that the ￿rst best allocations are supported as a ￿nancial
equilibrium.
Next, we consider the case in which taxes are levied on households in the ￿rst period
and the proceeds are given to bankers as a supplement to their net worth. The net worth
transfer is ￿nanced by taxes on households in period 1. Suppose the equilibrium is such that
the incentive constraint, (3.8), is binding. This implies that the ￿rst-best level of deposits,
￿ violates (3.8) and that (3.13) is satis￿ed with  at its e¢ cient level,  Let  denote
the tax-￿nanced transfer of net worth to bankers. The pre-tax level of banker net worth is
 and after taxes it is  +. We conjecture, and then verify, as for  su¢ ciently large, the
￿nancial equilibrium has the property that deposits equal ￿ ¬  the incentive constraint is





￿ ¬ ) = ￿( + 
￿)
 (3.15)
Note that +￿ is una⁄ected under the tax policy and the conjecture about the equilibrium.
A unique   0 that solves (3.15) is guaranteed to exist because the left side is monotonically
increasing in  and the left side is assumed to be smaller than the right when  = 0
To understand how the representative household responds to the tax ￿nanced equity
injection, a suitable adjustment of (3.3) implies:
 =








Under our conjecture,  =  and ￿ is given by the expression on the left of the equality in
(3.15). Substituting, we obtain (3.11), the level of consumption in the ￿rst-best equilibrium.
This veri￿es our conjecture about the period 1 level of consumption. It is straightforward
to verify that the ￿rst-best level of period 2 consumption satis￿es the period 2 household
budget constraint. We summarize our ￿ndings as follows:
Proposition 3.6. Suppose (3.8) binds in equilibrium, so that deposits are strictly below
their ￿rst-best level in a ￿nancial equilibrium. Then, a tax-￿nanced transfer of net worth to
bankers at a level de￿ned in (3.15) ensures that the ￿rst best allocations are supported as a
￿nancial equilibrium.
4. Moral Hazard II: Unobserved Banker E⁄ort
The basic framework of the model used here is similar to the one in the previous section.
The di⁄erence lies in the source of moral hazard. To make a high return for their depositors,
19we assume that bankers must exert an unobserved and costly e⁄ort. As in the case of the
model in the previous section, the model used here can articulate the idea that the banking
system supported e¢ cient allocations prior to 2007, but then became dysfunctional as a
consequence of a fall in bank net worth. As in the previous section, the fall in net worth
pushes the economy against a non-linearity, which causes an increase in interest rate spreads,
a fall in intermediation and in the activities that intermediation supports.
Despite the similarities, there are some important di⁄erences between the models in
terms of their implications for policy. For example, the model used here implies that equity
injections into banks during a crisis have no impact on equilibrium allocations. The model
of the previous section implies that injections of bank equity can move the economy to the
e¢ cient allocations. In addition we use the model of this section to study a broader range
of policy interventions. We consider the e⁄ects of government bailouts of the creditors of
banks whose assets perform poorly. The model is also useful for thinking about the bene￿ts
of imposing leverage restrictions on banks.
The following section provides an intuitive summary of the analysis. After that comes
the formal presentation.
4.1. Overview
There are two periods. There is a large number of households. Each household has many
bankers and workers. Bankers are endowed in the ￿rst period with their own net worth and
they combine this with deposits to acquire securities from ￿rms.24 There is a large number
of ￿rms, each having access to one investment project. The investment project available to
some ￿rms is a good one in that it has a high (￿xed) gross rate of return. If these ￿rms
invest one unit of goods in period 1, they are able to produce  goods in period 2. The
investment project available to other ￿rms is bad and we denote the gross rate of return
on these investment projects by  where    The rates of return,  and , are
exogenous and technologically determined.
Empirically, we observe that some banks enjoy higher pro￿ts than others, and we interpret
this as re￿ ecting that banks cannot hold a fully diversi￿ed portfolio of assets. This could be
because there are many di⁄erent types of investment projects - di⁄erentiated according to
industry, geographic location, etc. - and there are gains to specializing in the identi￿cation
of good projects of a particular type. In the model, these observations are captured by the
assumption that banks can purchase the securities of at most one ￿rm. Similarly, a ￿rm
can issue securities to at most one bank. Production for a ￿rm is costless, and the rate of
return on bank securities is identical to the rate of return on the underlying investment.25
The task of a banker is to exert an unobserved and costly e⁄ort,  to identify a ￿rm with
a good project The ex post rate of return on the banker￿ s securities is observed, but this
does not reveal the banker￿ s e⁄ort. This is because  only a⁄ects the probability, () that
a banker identi￿es a good ￿rm.
We de￿ne the e¢ cient level of e⁄ort and of intermediation as those that occur in com-
petitive markets in the special case that the e⁄orts exerted by bankers are fully observed.
24Whether the ￿ securities￿take the form of loans or equity is the same in our model.
25Given that a bank undertakes a costly search to ￿nd a good ￿rm, it would be interesting to explore an
alternative model formulation in which the ￿rm and bank that ￿nd each other engage in bilateral negotiations.
20For a banker to have the incentive to exert the e¢ cient level of e⁄ort when e⁄ort is not
observed requires that it receive a reward that is linked in the right way to the performance
of its securities. Let 
 and 
 denote the interest rate on bank deposits when the bank￿ s
securities pay  and  respectively. We show that a banker sets e⁄ort to its e¢ cient level
when 
 = 
 i.e., when its cost of funds is independent of the performance of its securities.
We characterize the situation in which 
 = 
 as one in which the banker￿ s creditors (i.e.,
the depositors) do not share in the losses when a banker￿ s securities do not perform well.
A banker exerts the e¢ cient level of e⁄ort when 
 = 
 because it fully internalizes the
marginal bene￿t of increased e⁄ort.
For the arrangement, 
 = 
 to be feasible it is necessary that the banker have a
su¢ ciently large amount of net worth. Otherwise the banker would not have enough funds
to pay depositors in the probability 1¬() event that its loan turns out to be bad.26 When
net worth is too low in this sense, then a bank￿ s depositors share in the loss that occurs
when their bank￿ s securities generate a bad return. In this case, depositors must receive a
relatively high return, 
  
 in the good state as compensation. But, with this cross-state
pattern in deposit rates the banker does not fully capture the marginal product of increased
e⁄ort. Thus, when banker net worth is not su¢ ciently high to permit an uncontingent
deposit rate, the banker￿ s incentive to exert e⁄ort is reduced. This reduced e⁄ort has a
consequence that relatively more low quality projects are funded. As a result, the overall
rate of return on deposits falls and so the quantity of deposits falls too. With the fall in
deposits, intermediation and investment are reduced.
We now brie￿ y discuss the concept of the ￿ interest rate spread￿ . We can loosely think of
the bad state as a bankruptcy state, a state that occurs with relatively low probability. For
the purpose of de￿ning the interest rate spread, we think of the ￿ interest rate￿paid by a bank
on its source of funds as the rate it pays, 
 when the good state is realized. This notion of
the interest rate is similar to that of the face value of a bond, which speci￿es what the holder
receives as long as nothing goes wrong with the issuing ￿rm. Households are the ultimate
source of funds for banks and they receive an interest rate,  that is risk free. This is so,
because the representative household is perfectly diversi￿ed across banks (it accomplishes
this using a mutual fund) and so it receives the average rate of return across all banks. With
these considerations in mind, we de￿ne the interest rate spread as follows:


 ¬  (4.1)
When bank net worth is su¢ ciently high, then 
 ¬  = 0 so that the interest rate spread
is zero. When net worth falls enough, then 
 must be low in the bad state and thus 

must be relatively high in the good state. As a result, the interest rate spread is positive
when bank net worth is low.
In sum, when bank net worth is high (we refer to this as ￿ normal times￿ ), then the
interest rate spread is zero and e⁄ort and deposits are at their e¢ cient levels. When bank
net worth is low (a ￿ crisis￿ ), then there is a positive interest rate spread and deposits are
below their e¢ cient levels. In this sense, the ￿nancial system is dysfunctional when net worth
is su¢ ciently low. From this perspective, the model implications are qualitatively similar to
those of the model in the previous section.
26Bankers do not have access to funds other than their own and those provided by depositors.
21Still, the economics of the two models di⁄er. For example, in the model considered here,
the interest rate spread compensates for the low returns paid by banks with bad investments.
In principle, one could perform an empirical study to measure the bank losses that are
re￿ ected in the high risk spread. In the model of section 3 the interest rate spread re￿ ects a
fear of out-of-equilibrium misbehavior by banks. As such, the fear is about something that
does not actually happen.
The two models also di⁄er in terms of their implications for policy. In the model of
the previous section equity injections have no e⁄ect in normal times and they improve the
e¢ ciency of the economy in a crisis. In the model here, equity injections in normal times
are counterproductive because they reduce bankers￿incentives to exert e⁄ort. The intuition
is simple. We treat an equity injection as a ￿ loan￿from the government that must be repaid
according to the actual return that the bank receives as a consequence of the government
loan. The direct impact of this sort of loan on the bank is nil since it generates zero net
cash ￿ ow regardless of whether the bank identi￿es a good or bad ￿rm. However, there is a
general equilibrium e⁄ect that matters. From the point of view of the household, an equity
injection corresponds to a tax hike in the ￿rst period, followed by a tax reduction in the
second period. Because this pattern of taxes satis￿es part of the household￿ s desire to save,
the household responds by reducing its own deposits. With fewer deposits, the banker has
less incentive to exert e⁄ort. With less e⁄ort, the average quality of bank securities falls.
This produces a fall in the risk free interest rate paid to households and causes them to save
less. The net e⁄ect is that intermediation falls below its ideal level.
It turns out that in a crisis, an equity injection has no e⁄ect in the model. This is because
in a crisis there is an additional positive e⁄ect from equity investments which cancels the
negative e⁄ects in normal times that were discussed in the previous paragraph. Recall, the
de￿nition of a crisis time is that net worth is too low to permit a state-non contingent
interest rate on deposits. When household deposits with banks are reduced in response to
an equity injection, it becomes possible to reduce the degree of state contingency in deposit
rates. This is because, with lower deposits the amount of money owed by banks in the bad
state is smaller and more likely to be manageable with bank net worth. The reduced state
contingency in deposit rates improves the incentive of banks to exert e⁄ort. This positive
e⁄ect exactly cancels the negative e⁄ects that occur in a normal time.
We also investigate other policies. For example, we study the e⁄ects of placing tax-
￿nanced government deposits in banks during a crisis. Such a policy has no e⁄ect because,
consistent with the Barro-Wallace proposition, households respond by reducing their deposits
by the same amount. Subsidizing banks￿cost of funds in a crisis is helpful, because this policy
improves the likelihood that a bank can cover losses with its own net worth. Bailing out the
creditors of banks whose loans perform badly is also welfare-increasing in a crisis. Finally,
we ￿nd that leverage restrictions improve welfare in a crisis. The reason for this is that by
forcing banks to reduce their level of deposits, a leverage restriction increases the likelihood
that a bank can cover its losses with its own net worth, thus increasing its incentive to exert
e⁄ort. This is welfare-improving in a crisis, when banker e⁄ort is below its e¢ cient level,
absent government intervention.
The following subsections present the formal description of the model and the results,
respectively.
224.2. Model
There are many identical households, each composed of many workers and bankers. The
workers receive an endowment,  in period 1 and the households allocate the endowment
between period 1 consumption,  and period 1 deposits in mutual funds,  All quantity
variables are expressed in per household member terms. The gross rate of return on deposits
is risk free and is denoted by  The preferences of the representative household are as in the
previous example, in (3.2). Optimality of the deposit decision is associated with the usual
intertemporal Euler equation. This Euler equation and the ￿rst period budget constraint
are given by:

0 () = ￿
0 () (4.2)
 +  =  (4.3)
In the second period, households receive  and pro￿ts from their bankers, ￿ In the interior
equilibria that we study, the second period budget constraint is satis￿ed as a strict equality:
 =  + ￿
We impose the following restriction on the curvature parameter in the utility function (see
(3.2)):
0     1 (4.4)
The upper bound on   ensures that the equilibrium response of  to  is positive, which we
view as the interesting case.
Bankers receive an endowment,  in the ￿rst period. They combine  with deposits
received from mutual funds and buy securities that ￿nance the investment of a ￿rm. Firms
are perfectly competitive and costless to operate, so the bank receives the entire return on
its ￿rm￿ s investment project. The probability, () that the ￿rm whose securities the bank
buys are good is speci￿ed as follows:
() =  +    0 (4.5)
so that 0 () =  00 () = 0 We only consider model parameter values that imply 0 
()  1 in equilibrium.
The mean, () and variance,  () of a bank￿ s asset are given by
() = ()
 + (1 ¬ ())















This expression is negative for ()  12 In our analysis, we assume () satis￿es this
condition. Thus, when bankers increase e⁄ort, the mean of the return on their securities
increases and the variance decreases.
Our primary interest is in the scenario with ￿ ￿nancial frictions￿ , in which the mutual
fund does not observe the e⁄ort,  made by the banker. To this end, it is of interest to
23￿rst discuss the observable e⁄ort version of the model in which  is observed by the mutual
fund. Throughout, we assume that  is observed by the banker￿ s own household. Absent this
assumption, a banker would always set  = 0 because  is costly to the banker and because a
banker￿ s consumption while at home is independent of the return on the banker￿ s portfolio.
4.3. Observable E⁄ort Benchmark







 denote the gross returns on  paid by bankers whose ￿rms turn
out to be good and bad, respectively. All four elements of the contract are assumed to be
directly veri￿able to the mutual fund in the observable e⁄ort version of the model. Through-
out, we assume that su¢ cient sanctions exist so that veri￿able deviations from a contract
never occur.
The representative competitive mutual fund itself takes deposits,  from households and
commits to paying households a gross rate of return, . The mutual fund is competitive in
that it treats  as exogenous. Because the representative mutual fund is perfectly diversi￿ed,
its revenues from deposits,  are ()
 + [1 ¬ ()]
 The mutual fund must repay
 to depositors, so that the pro￿ts of the mutual fund are ()
+[1 ¬ ()]
¬ 
Because mutual funds are competitive, pro￿ts must be zero:27
()

 + [1 ¬ ()]

 =  (4.7)
We assume the banker￿ s only source of funds for repaying the mutual fund is the earnings
on its investment. In each state of nature the banker must earn enough to pay its obligation
to the mutual fund in that state of nature:

 ( + ) ¬ 

 ￿ 0 
 ( + ) ¬ 

 ￿ 0
In practice, these constraints will either never bind or they will only bind in the bad state







to a bank is

 ( + ) ¬ 

 ￿ 0 (4.8)






 from the menu de￿ned by
(4.7) and (4.8).










+ (1 ¬ ())
￿










where 22 is the banker￿ s utility cost of expending e⁄ort and ￿ denotes the marginal value
of consumption for the household of the banker. In addition,  denotes the deposits issued
by the banker and is distinct from the deposit decision of the banker￿ s household. As part of
27If instead pro￿ts were positive, mutual funds would set  = 1 but this exceeds the resources of
households who make the deposits. If a positive value of  produced negative pro￿ts, then pro￿t maximizing
mutual funds would earn zero pro￿ts by setting  = 0 But, this would be less than the positive amount of
deposits supplied by households in the interior equilibria that we study.
24the terms of the banker￿ s arrangement with its household, the banker is required to seek a
contract that maximizes (4.9). Throughout the analysis we assume the banker￿ s household
observes all the variables in (4.9) and that the household has the means to compel the banker
to do what the household requires of it.












+ (1 ¬ ())
￿























 ( + )
￿
where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier on (4.7) and ￿ ￿ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on (4.8).
An interior equilibrium for this economy is:
Observable E⁄ort Equilibrium:      ￿; 
 
 such that
(i) the household maximization problem is solved
(ii) mutual funds earn zero pro￿ts
(iii) the banker problem, (4.10), is solved
(iv) markets clear
(v)   0
We now study the properties of this equilibrium.




























































 : ¬￿p() + ￿p() = 0


 : ¬￿(1 ¬ ()) + ￿(1 ¬ ()) + ￿ = 0
￿ : ()









 ( + )
￿
= 0 ￿ ￿ 0

 ¬ 
 ( + ) ￿ 0
where ￿ : ￿indicates the ￿rst order condition with respect to the variable,  Adding the

 and 
 equations, we obtain:
￿ = ￿ ¬ ￿ (4.11)
Substituting (4.11) back into the 
 equation, we ￿nd
￿ = 0
so that the cash constraint is non-binding. Substituting the latter two results back into the
system of equations, they reduce to:






( + ) (4.12)
 :  = ()
 + (1 ¬ ())
 (4.13)
￿ :  = ()

 + (1 ¬ ())

 (4.14)
25Note from (4.12) that in setting e⁄ort,  the banker looks only at the sum,  + and not at
how this sum breaks down into the component re￿ ecting banker￿ s own resources,  and the
component re￿ ecting the resources,  supplied by the mutual fund. By committing to care
for  as if these were the banker￿ s own funds, the banker is able to obtain better contract
terms from the mutual fund. The banker is able to commit to the level of e⁄ort in (4.12)
because  is observable to the mutual fund and throughout the analysis we assume that all
actions which are veri￿able are enforceable.









+ (1 ¬ ())
￿






using the zero pro￿t condition of mutual funds. Thus, the representative household￿ s second
period budget constraint is:
 = ( + ) (4.16)






Although the observable e⁄ort version of the model uniquely determines variables like
   and  it does not uniquely determine the values of the state contingent return on
deposits, 

. These are restricted only by (4.14) and (4.8). For example, there is an
equilibrium in which deposits have the following state contingent pattern: 
 =  
 = 
There may also be an equilibrium in which deposit rates are not state contingent, so that

 = 
 =  However, for the latter to be an equilibrium requires that  be su¢ ciently
large. The equilibrium values of      ￿; are the same across all state contingent
returns on deposits that are consistent with (4.14) and (4.8).
4.4. Unobservable E⁄ort
We now suppose that the banker￿ s e⁄ort,  is not observed by the mutual fund. Thus,
whatever  
 










+ (1 ¬ ())
￿










The ￿rst order condition necessary for optimality is:



















 reduces the banker￿ s incentive to exert e⁄ort. This is because in this
case the banker receives a smaller portion of the marginal increase in expected pro￿ts caused
by a marginal increase in e⁄ort. Understanding that  will be selected according to (4.18),






 that satisfy not just (4.8), but also
(4.18).















+ (1 ¬ ())
￿









































 ( + )
￿

where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier on (4.18).
The equilibrium concept used here is:
Unobservable E⁄ort Equilibrium:      ￿; 
 
 such that
(i) the household maximization problem is solved
(ii) mutual funds earn zero pro￿ts
(iii) the banker problem, (4.19), is solved
(iv) markets clear
(v)   0
To understand the properties of this equilibrium, consider the ￿rst order necessary con-


























































































 : ¬￿p() + ￿p() + ￿￿p
0 () = 0


 : ¬￿(1 ¬ ()) + ￿(1 ¬ ()) ¬ ￿￿p
0 () + ￿ = 0
￿ :  = ()

 + (1 ¬ ())























 ( + )
￿





 ( + )
￿
￿ 0
We refer to these equations - and their counterparts below - by their names to the left of the
colon. Add the 
 and 
 equations, to obtain (4.11). After using (4.11) to substitute out
27for ￿ in (4.20), making use of (4.5) and rearranging:28








 + ￿ = 0 (4.21)
 :  = ()




 : ￿() = ￿￿b
￿ :  = ()

 + (1 ¬ ())






















 ( + )
￿





 ( + )
￿
￿ 0
We distinguish two cases. Equilibrium in a ￿ normal time￿corresponds to the case when
 is su¢ ciently large that the cash constraint is nonbinding, so that ￿ = 0 Equilibrium in
a ￿ crisis time￿corresponds to the case when ￿  0
We ￿rst consider the properties of equilibrium in a normal time. Substituting ￿ = 0 into
the 
 equation, we deduce that in an interior equilibrium with ￿  0 the multiplier on






 =  (4.22)
It then follows from the ￿ equation that:





( + ) (4.23)
Equations (4.23) and the ￿ equation in (4.21), together with the three household equilibrium
conditions, (4.3), (4.2) and (4.16), represent 5 conditions. These conditions can be used to
determine the following 5 variables:

A notable feature of the equilibrium in a normal time is that the incentive constraint,
(4.18), is non-binding and the allocations are e¢ cient in the sense that they coincide with
the allocations in the version of the model in which e⁄ort is observable. The level of e⁄ort
exerted by the banker in the unobservable e⁄ort equilibrium coincides with what it is in the
observable e⁄ort equilibrium because the loan contract transfers the full marginal product of
e⁄ort to the banker. This is accomplished by making the rate of interest on banker deposits
not state contingent (see (4.22)). The interest rate spread in this equilibrium (see (4.1)) is
zero in a normal time. We state these results as a proposition:
Proposition 4.1. When the cash constraint, (4.8), does not bind (i.e., ￿ = 0), then the
allocations in the unobserved e⁄ort equilibrium coincide with those in the observed e⁄ort
equilibrium and the interest rate spread is zero.
28The  equation in (4.21) is a simpli￿ed version of the  equation in (4.20), obtained as follows. Substitute
from (4.11) and the 
 and ￿ equations in (4.20) into the  equation in (4.20) to obtain, after some algebra:
0 = (￿ ¬ ￿)
￿
() + (1 ¬ ()) ¬ 
￿

The result follows from the observation that (￿ ¬ ￿) is strictly positive since ￿ ￿ 0 and ￿  0 in an interior
equilibrium. The  equation in (4.21) is a simpli￿ed version of the  equation in (4.20), after making use of
(4.11) and the ￿ equation in (4.20).




 ( + ) (4.24)
In this case, the observed and unobserved e⁄ort equilibria diverge, since the cash constraint
never binds in the observed e⁄ort equilibrium. The 
 equation in (4.21) implies ￿  0, so













That is, the banker in a crisis equilibrium exerts less e⁄ort, for given  +  than it does in
the observed e⁄ort equilibrium. The reason is that with (4.25), the banker does not capture
the full marginal return from e⁄ort. With reduced e⁄ort, equation  in (4.21) shows that
equilibrium  is smaller. Given (4.4), the household equilibrium conditions, (4.3), (4.2) and
(4.16), imply a lower  reinforcing the low  We summarize these ￿ndings in the following
proposition:
Proposition 4.2. When the cash constraint, (4.8), binds (i.e., ￿  0), then   and  in
the unobserved e⁄ort equilibrium are lower than they are in the observed e⁄ort equilibrium,
and the interest rate spread is positive.
4.5. Implications for Policy
In this section, we consider the impact of government deposits and equity injections into
banks, and show that these are not helpful in a crisis. We then show that bank deposit rate
subsidies and transfers of net worth to banks can solve the crisis completely by eliminating
the interest rate spread and moving allocations to their e¢ cient levels. Finally, we study the
e⁄ects of bailing out the creditors of banks with poor-performing securities and the e⁄ects
of leverage restrictions.
4.5.1. Government Deposits into Mutual Funds
Consider the case where the government raises taxes,  and deposits the proceeds in the
mutual fund. The household￿ s period 1 budget constraint is given by:
 + ~  =  (4.26)
where ~  denotes + and  denotes deposits placed by households in the mutual fund. The
intertemporal condition, (4.2) is una⁄ected by the change. The household￿ s second period
budget constraint is una⁄ected by the change, except that  is replaced by ~  Similarly, the
equilibrium conditions associated with the banker problem, (4.19), are unchanged, with the
exception that  is replaced by ~  In particular, if the government deposits taxpayer money
into the mutual funds, taxpayers reduce their deposits by the same amount and there is no
29change. From the point of view of households in the economy, it is the same whether deposits
are held in their capacity as taxpayers or directly in their own name. That is, the policy
considered in this section does not overcome the Barro-Wallace irrelevance proposition. This
conclusion makes use of the assumption we use throughout our analysis, that an equilibrium
is interior. In the present context, this implies that  is not so large that the constraint,
 ￿ 0 is non-binding. We summarize these results in the form of a proposition:
Proposition 4.3. In an interior equilibrium, the level of tax-￿nanced government deposits
are irrelevant for the equilibrium levels of  + 
4.5.2. Equity Injections into Banks
In this section we adopt the same interpretation of equity injections as in section 3.2.1. That
is, the government raises taxes,  and hands these over to the banks in period 1. The
government requires that the banks repay the earnings they actually make on these funds in
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Note that taxes enter revenues symmetrically with deposits and the bank￿ s own net worth.
On the cost side, equity injections require that banks pay the government the actual rate
of return on its securities. Thus, equity injections have no direct impact on bank pro￿ts,
because they enter revenues and costs in exactly the same way. For the same reason, equity
injections also do not change the banker￿ s cash requirement in the bad state. That is,
the bank requirement that revenues be no smaller than costs is, in the presence of equity
injections,





so that  cancels from both sides and thus coincides with (4.8). We conclude that the
banker￿ s problem, (4.19), is completely unaltered by the presence of equity injections.
Now consider the household problem. The period 1 budget constraint is:
 +  ￿  ¬  (4.27)
re￿ ecting that equity injections,  are ￿nanced with taxes on households. The government
transfers the revenues from equity injections back to households in period 2. In this way,
the period 2 household budget constraint is:
 =  + ()
￿





+ (1 ¬ ())
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 + (1 ¬ ())
￿

= ( +  + ) (4.28)
The last terms on the right re￿ ects that the government￿ s distribution of equity among banks
is completely diversi￿ed. The intertemporal Euler equation, (4.2), is unchanged.
From the household problem we see that an increase in  induces an equal reduction in
 for a given value of  Note that although  does not enter the banker￿ s problem,  does.
Thus, it is possible that  has an indirect e⁄ect on the equilibrium.
30Consider ￿rst the case when the cash constraint in the bad state is not binding, ￿ = 0.
In this case, the problem solved by the banker￿ s contract is given by (4.19) with ￿ = 0,
so that (4.22) and (4.23) are satis￿ed. In this case, increased equity injections, for a given
interest rate,  reduce deposits and so reduce the banker￿ s incentives to exert e⁄ort,  (see
(4.23)). This in turn produces a fall in , so that  falls some more. Thus, + falls with a
tax-￿nanced equity injection in a normal time when the cash constraint is not binding. The
intuition for this result is described in section 4.1. We summarize this result in the form of
a proposition:
Proposition 4.4. If the cash constraint, (4.8), is not binding, then an equity injection
produces a fall in e⁄ort,  the interest rate,  and total intermediation,  + 
In a crisis time when the cash constraint in the bad state is binding, the fall in  + 
that occurs with an equity injection is o⁄set by a second e⁄ect. The two cancel, and so
equity injections are irrelevant in a crisis. The second e⁄ect occurs because a fall in deposits,
 loosens the cash constraint, (4.8), in the bad state. This relaxation of (4.8) requires an
increase in the rate of return on deposits for banks in the bad state. The reduction in the
state contingency of deposit rates enhances bankers￿incentives to exert e⁄ort. As a result,
the fraction of good projects that are identi￿ed is increased, so that the risk free rate rises,
leading to a rise in deposits. Formally,
Proposition 4.5. If the cash constraint is binding, then an equity injection has no impact
on consumption,   the interest rate, , and the volume of intermediation,  + 
See the appendix for a proof of this proposition.
We summarize our two propositions as follows. In a normal time when the cash constraint
is not binding, equity injections are counterproductive, as they lead to a reduction in e⁄ort
by bankers. In crisis times, an equity injection satis￿es the Barro-Wallace irrelevance result,
so that they have no impact on + as long as the cash constraint remains binding.
Once equity injections reach a su¢ cient scale, then the cash constraint ceases to bind and
Proposition 4.4 is relevant. That is, equity injections that are large enough to render the
cash constraint non-binding are counterproductive in that they reduce e⁄ort.
4.5.3. Interest Rate Subsidies and Net Worth Transfers to Banks
As we have emphasized, the heart of the problem in a crisis is that banks with poor-
performing securities do not have enough resources to fully absorb their losses. Equilibrium
in this case requires that deposit rates covary positively with the return on the bank port-
folio. But, this positive covariance leads to welfare reducing allocations by reducing banks￿
incentive to exert e⁄ort. State non-contingency in the banks￿deposit rate is crucial if they
are to have enough incentive to exert the e¢ cient level of e⁄ort. This reasoning suggests
two policies that can help solve the problem. First, by reducing the costs of their deposits, a
tax-￿nanced subsidy on banks￿cost of funds makes it possible for banks to cover their losses
in bad states and for bank deposit rates to be state non-contingent. Second, a tax-￿nanced
transfer of equity to banks also allows them to cover their losses in bad states with state
non-contingent deposit rates.
31Consider ￿rst the case of interest rate subsidies. Suppose we have the allocations and
returns in the observable e⁄ort equilibrium. The assumption that we are in a crisis implies
that if  = 
 = 
 where  solves (4.13), then the cash constraint, (4.8), is violated:
  
 ( + ) (4.29)
Let ￿ solve
(1 ¬ ￿) = 
 ( + ) (4.30)
A value of ￿  0 is guaranteed to exist because the left side of this expression is monotonically
decreasing in ￿ and it is zero when ￿ = 1 All the equilibrium conditions associated with
the banker problem (see (4.21)) are satis￿ed, with ￿ = 0 As a result, the banker exerts the
level of e⁄ort that occurs in the observed e⁄ort equilibrium (see (4.23)). The key thing is
that state non-contingency of deposit rates causes the banker to exert e⁄ort as though the
deposits belonged to the banker. The fact that the level of deposit rates is lower across the
realized returns of its securities is irrelevant to the e⁄ort exerted by the banker.
It remains only to verify that the household decisions in the observable e⁄ort equilibrium
also solve their problem in the unobservable e⁄ort equilibrium with an interest rate subsidy.
The households￿period 1 budget constraint, (4.3), is una⁄ected. The household￿ s intertem-
poral Euler equation, (4.2), is also not a⁄ected. The only household equilibrium condition
that requires attention is its second period budget constraint, because the tax subsidy to
banks is ￿nanced by period 2 taxes,  = ￿
 =  + ￿ ¬ 
Bank pro￿ts, ￿ are higher under the interest rate subsidy than they are in the observable
e⁄ort equilibrium. However, they are higher by exactly  So, the assumption that the
period 2 household budget constraint is satis￿ed in an observable e⁄ort equilibrium implies
that the allocations in that equilibrium also satisfy the above budget constraint with taxes.
We summarize these ￿ndings as follows:
Proposition 4.6. Suppose the cash constraint in an unobservable e⁄ort equilibrium is bind-
ing. The interest rate subsidy, (4.30), ￿nanced by a period 2 tax on households causes the
allocations in the unobservable e⁄ort equilibrium to coincide with those in the observable
e⁄ort equilibrium.
The interest subsidy policy is of wider interest because it allows us to address a common
view that interest rate subsidies to banks lead them to undertake excessive risk. In the
environment here, an interest rate subsidy in a crisis induces bankers to exert greater e⁄ort,
 This leads to a rise in the mean return on assets, and a fall in their variance. Thus, this
environment does not rationalize the common view about the impact of interest subsidies
on risk taking by banks.
We now turn to tax ￿nanced transfers of net worth to banks. Suppose again that the cash
constraint is binding in the unobservable e⁄ort equilibrium. The government raises taxes,
 in period 1 and transfers the proceeds to banks. If the transfer is su¢ ciently large, then
the cash constraint in the unobservable e⁄ort equilibrium ceases to bind. To establish this
32result, suppose we have the allocations in the observable e⁄ort equilibrium in hand. The
assumption that we are in a crisis implies that if  = 
 = 
 where  solves (4.13), then
the cash constraint, (4.8), is violated, as in (4.29).
We ￿rst consider the response of the observable e⁄ort equilibrium to   0 Banks￿
pretax net worth is  and after taxes their net worth is  +  We conjecture, and then
verify, that with   0, deposits decline one-for-one in the observable e⁄ort equilibrium and
period 1 and period 2 consumption allocations do not change. Suppose that  satis￿es:
( ¬ ) = 
 ( + ) (4.31)
The value of  that satis￿es this equation exists and is unique because the left side is
monotonically decreasing and continuous in  and it is zero when  =  According to (4.31)
the cash constraint is (marginally) non-binding. It is easily veri￿ed that the household period
1 budget constraint and Euler equations in the observable e⁄ort equilibrium are satis￿ed (see
(4.3) and (4.2)). It is also easily veri￿ed that households￿second period income is invariant
to .29 Finally, the bank equilibrium conditions, (4.12), (4.13), (4.14), easily seen to be
satis￿ed. We conclude that we have an observable e⁄ort equilibrium. Because in addition
the cash constraint is satis￿ed, it follows that we have an unobserved e⁄ort equilibrium too.
We summarize our ￿nding as follows:
Proposition 4.7. Suppose the cash constraint in an unobservable e⁄ort equilibrium is bind-
ing. The net worth subsidy, (4.31), ￿nanced by a period 1 tax on households causes the
allocations in the unobservable e⁄ort equilibrium to coincide with those in the observable
e⁄ort equilibrium.
4.5.4. Creditor Bailouts
In this subsection we explore another policy that can increase welfare in a crisis. This policy
subsidizes bank creditors (i.e., the mutual funds) when their portfolios perform poorly (i.e.,
when banks earn ). This policy is helpful because it goes to the heart of the problem.
The problem when net worth is too low is that creditors must share in the losses when bank
portfolios perform poorly. Under these circumstances creditors require 
 to be high to
compensate them for the losses associated with the low 
 This increase in 
 ¬ 
 causes
bankers to reduce e⁄ort below the e¢ cient level (recall (4.18)). By subsidizing creditors in
the bad state, 
 ¬
 is reduced and e⁄ort moves back in the direction of its e¢ cient level.
We explore the quantitative magnitude of these e⁄ects in this section.
Let 
 denote, as before, the bank￿ s payment in the bad state. The amount the mutual
fund actually receives is (1 + ￿)
 We assume that the bailout, ￿
 is ￿nanced by a lump
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 ( + )
￿

Note that ￿ only enters the zero pro￿t condition of mutual funds. Because ￿ does not
explicitly enter the banks￿own pro￿ts, the incentive constraint on bank e⁄ort is not a⁄ected.
For a detailed characterization of the loan contract and an algorithm for computing the
equilibrium, see section A.3 in the Appendix.
We compute the socially optimal value of ￿ in a numerical example. The social welfare
function aggregates the utility of everyone in the household:





We do the computations for a crisis situation, one in which  is su¢ ciently low that ￿ 6=
0 We construct an example by ￿rst selecting an equilibrium with ￿ = 0 in which the
cash constraint is non-binding, i.e., ￿ = 0 We then reduce  su¢ ciently so that the cash
constraint is binding and we then compute equilibria for a range of values of ￿




where  and  are the parameters of () (see (4.5)), and   ￿ are parameters that govern
household utility (see (3.2)). We set ￿ = 097,   = 09,  = 05 and  = 1 and we set the
other four parameters, , ,  and  to achieve  = 1=￿ and the following three calibration
targets:




where  () denotes the variance, across banks, of returns (see (4.6)). The equilibrium
associated with this parameterization is characterized by a non-binding cash constraint. In
this equilibrium, 
 = 
 =  when ￿ = 0 We veri￿ed numerically, that ￿ = 0 corresponds
to a local maximum of the social welfare function.
We reduced the value of  to 070 in which case the cash constraint is binding. Figure 2
displays features of the equilibrium for values of ￿ 2 (02) The optimal value of ￿ is roughly
07282 Note that equilibrium e⁄ort,  is increasing in ￿ As indicated in the introduction to
this section, this result re￿ ects that 
¬
 is falling in ￿ The rise in equilibrium e⁄ort gives
rise to an increase in the return,  generated by the ￿nancial system and hence produces a
rise in deposits, 
4.5.5. Leverage Restrictions
In normal times, a binding leverage restriction on banks reduces welfare because the equi-
librium is e¢ cient. However, bankers make ine¢ ciently low e⁄ort in a crisis because their
34cost of funds is positively correlated with the performance of their assets. This correlation
re￿ ects that bankers￿net worth is too low for them to insulate creditors from losses when
banks experience a low return,  Obviously, if banks had a su¢ ciently low level of deposits
when net worth is low, then bankers￿net worth would be su¢ cient to cover losses. This
raises the possibility that leverage restrictions may be welfare improving when net worth is
low. However, recall that bank incentives are not only a function of 
 ¬
 but also of the
level of deposits,  (see (4.18)). So, it is not so obvious, ex ante, that leverage restrictions are
desirable in a crisis. For this reason, we investigate the desirability of leverage restrictions in
a numerical example. In the example, we use the same parameter values as the ones in the
previous subsection. We ￿nd that leverage restrictions indeed are desirable in crisis times.
We suppose that the government imposes a restriction on the equilibrium contract, which
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 ( + )
￿
+ ￿
￿￿  ¬ ( + )
￿

where ￿ ￿ 0 is the multiplier on the leverage constraint. We assume the last two constraints
are binding, so that ￿  0 ￿  0
The nine panels in Figure 3 display selected characteristics of the equilibrium, for a range
of values of ￿  and for two values of the bailout rate, ￿ The two values of ￿ are ￿ = 0 and
￿ = 07282 which is its optimal value when there are no leverage restrictions. When ￿ = 0
and 07282 leverage in the absence of leverage restrictions is 2.0453 and 2.0684, respectively.
The highest value of ￿  reported in Figure 3 is 20453
Consider the case, ￿ = 0 ￿rst. Note from Panel b that social welfare initially rises as ￿ 
is reduced from ￿  = 20453. The optimal value of ￿  is 1.9980. This represents a 2.3 percent
cut in leverage, which translates into a reasonably substantial cut of roughly 5 percent in
deposits,  Consistent with the intuition provided above, the reduction in ￿  reduces the
state contingency in banks￿costs of credit, 
 ¬ 
 (see Panel i). According to Panel e and
Panel h, the fall in 
 ¬ 
 results in higher e⁄ort,  despite the lower level of deposits. As
a result, the leverage restriction produces an increase in the cross-section average return on
bank portfolios (Panel d), as well as a fall in the cross-section variance,  () in (4.6). To
be consistent with clearing in the market for deposits, the deposit rate,  must fall as the
leverage restriction becomes more binding (see Panel c). With the fall in the deposit rate and
the increase in the average return on assets, there is a rise in the net pro￿ts earned by banks
on deposits. In the absence of government intervention, competition drives these pro￿ts to
35zero.30 In e⁄ect, the government reduction in ￿  causes the banking sector to behave as a
monopsonist. Restricting ￿  raises banker utility, (4.9), according to Panel a.
We now turn to the case, ￿ = 07282 The results suggest that bailouts are to some
extent a substitute for leverage restrictions. To see this, note that when ￿ is positive,
then the optimal level of leverage is raised. This property of the model starkly contradicts
conventional wisdom, which maintains that leverage restrictions are required to undo the
bad side e⁄ects of bailout commitments.
The conventional wisdom on leverage can perhaps be paraphrased as follows: ￿bailouts
reduce the incentive for creditors to play a socially important role in monitoring bankers,
and this leads bankers to choose overly risky portfolios￿ . In our model, creditors have no
ability to monitor bankers and so this monitoring channel is not present. However, based
on comparing the unobservable and observed e⁄ort versions of our model, we can conjecture
what would happen if we modi￿ed our model so that creditors could decide, at a cost,
whether and how much to monitor banks. Recall that in the observed e⁄ort version of our
model studied in section 4.4 creditors perfectly monitor the activities of the banker. In that
model, even if net worth is so low that creditors must share in banker losses, the e⁄ort
level of bankers is e¢ cient. Thus, suppose net worth is low, so that the observable and
unobservable e⁄ort equilibria di⁄er. Suppose further that the economy is repeated twice,
with the observable e⁄ort equilibrium occurring in a ￿rst date and the unobservable e⁄ort
equilibrium occurring in the second date. Loosely, one can interpret this two-date economy
(each date has two subperiods) as one in which creditors monitor in the ￿rst date but do not
monitor in the second date. In this model, the e⁄ort level of bankers is ine¢ ciently low in
the second date (recall Proposition 4.2) and the cross-sectional variance of their portfolios
increases as a result (see (4.6)). This reasoning suggests to us that our model would be
consistent with the conventional wisdom if creditor monitoring of bankers were endogenized.
Of course an important empirical question is whether in fact creditors do have the ability to
monitor banks apart from observing the performance of banker securities.
The other results corresponding to the case, ￿ = 07282 are consistent with the idea that
leverage complements bailouts in this model. For example, at every level of ￿  banker e⁄ort
is higher with ￿  0 than with ￿ = 0 Finally, note that the response of  (Panel e) and 
(Panel f) are invariant to ￿ This is because net worth and  are ￿xed in the ￿gure and in
this case leverage immediately determines  and 
5. Adverse Selection
We consider an environment that is similar to the one in the previous sections, except that
the friction now is adverse selection. As in the previous section, we capture the notion
that banks do not hold a diversi￿ed portfolio of assets with the assumption that each bank
can acquire the securities of at most one ￿rm. Each ￿rm in the economy has access to
an investment project which requires a ￿xed input of resources to operate. Firms have no
resources of their own and must rely on funding from a bank. Moreover, a ￿rm can have a
relationship with at most one bank.31 A ￿rm earns no rent from its investment project and
30See the  and ￿ equations in (4.21).
31Although unmodeled, this might re￿ ect that banks must expend a ￿xed cost to evaluate a ￿rm￿ s project.
36turns over all revenues to the bank that holds its securities. Because a bank￿ s own net worth
is not su¢ cient to ￿nance the investment project of the ￿rm whose securities it purchases,
banks must also obtain deposits. Banks obtain deposits from mutual funds. Mutual funds
are competitive and each one is perfectly diversi￿ed across banks. Finally, mutual funds are
completely ￿nanced by risk-free deposits from households.
Because ￿rm investment projects di⁄er according to how risky they are, it follows that
the asset side of the balance sheets of di⁄erent banks di⁄er in terms of their risk. We assume
that the mutual funds that lend to banks cannot di⁄erentiate the high and low risk banks.
To compensate for losses from deposits in the riskier banks the interest rate spread - the
di⁄erence between the rate paid by banks to mutual funds and the rate paid by mutual
funds on their risk-free deposits - must be positive.32 The distortions associated with the
interest rate spread imply that intermediation and investment are below their e¢ cient levels.
A drop in bank net worth aggravates the distortions because banks become more dependent
on external ￿nance.
We insert the banks and mutual funds into the type of general equilibrium environment
considered in the previous sections of this paper. When bank net worth falls, interest rate
spreads jump and intermediation and investment drop. In this way the environment ratio-
nalizes the type of observations that motivate this paper.
Consistent with the analysis of Mankiw (1986) and Bernanke and Gertler (1990), who
consider a similar environment, we ￿nd that a subsidy to banks￿cost of funds can ameliorate
the problem.33 Indeed, a suitable choice of the interest rate subsidy can make the market
allocations coincide with the ￿rst-best e¢ cient allocations. This is so, even though the
subsidy policy does not require observing the riskiness of individual bank portfolios while
our e¢ cient allocations are those chosen by a benevolent planner who does observe those
risks. A subsidy to banks, by reducing their dependence on external ￿nance, can also improve
allocations. We consider government deposits in banks, but these do not overcome the Barro-
Wallace irrelevance result. That is, they have no e⁄ect on the allocations. Finally, we show
that a tax-￿nanced transfer of net worth to banks moves the allocations closer to ￿rst-best.
The gains from doing this are greater in a crisis, since a decline in bank net worth increases
the gap between equilibrium and ￿rst-best e¢ cient allocations.
5.1. Model
The economy is populated by many large and identical households. The representative
household has a unit measure of members composed of workers and bankers. The measure
of bankers is   134 All these agents receive perfect consumption insurance from households.
Workers and bankers receive endowments of  and  respectively, at the start of the ￿rst
period. Here,   0 is measured in household per capita terms. We ￿nd it convenient to
measure   1 in banker per capita terms. Thus, in household per capita terms the quantity
32Our model has the property that the only equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium, i.e., one in which banks
with di⁄erent risks receive the same loan contract from mutual funds. For additional discussion of pooling
and separating equilibria under adverse selection in credit markets, see Stiglitz and Weiss (1992) and the
references they cite.
33Our model is most closely related to the one in Mankiw (1986).
34The letter,  is not to be confused with e⁄ort in the previous section.
37of banker net worth is  The conditions that characterize household optimization are as
in the other parts of this paper, but are reproduced here for convenience:
 +  =  (5.1)

¬  = ￿
¬      0 (5.2)
 =  + e￿ (5.3)
Here,  denotes ￿rst period household consumption,  denotes deposits, and  denotes
second period consumption. These three variables are measured in household per capita
terms. The object, ￿ denotes earnings, in banker per capita terms, brought home in period
2 by bankers. Finally,  denotes the gross rate of interest on household deposits in mutual
funds. We now discuss the problems of ￿rms, bankers and mutual funds.35
Each banker meets a ￿rm with an investment project characterized by two parameters,
￿  0 and  2 [01] which are drawn independently from the cumulative distribution
function (cdf),  (￿) These parameters are explained below. The banker must then select
between one of two options. It can deposit its net worth in a mutual fund and earn 
Alternatively, it can combine its net worth with loans obtained from a mutual fund and
purchase securities from the ￿rm with which it is paired. From here on, we simplify the
language by pretending that the investment project operated by a bank￿ s ￿rm is operated
directly by the bank.
A banker￿ s realized values of ￿ and  are known only to the bank and to the household
to which the bank belongs. In particular, the mutual fund from which the banker obtains
funds does not observe ￿ and  The distribution,  is known to all. All investment projects
are indivisible and require an investment of one good in period 1. We explain the reason for
our assumption that there is an upper bound on the scale of investment in the discussion of
Proposition 5.3, which appears in section 5.2.1 below. In period 2, the investment project
yields ￿ goods with probability  and zero goods with probability 1 ¬  Our analysis is
greatly simpli￿ed by placing the following restriction on  :
￿ = ￿ ￿ (5.4)
where ￿ ￿ is a non-random parameter known to all. Thus, each banker￿ s investment project
generates the same expected return, but di⁄ers in terms of riskiness. We characterize  by
specifying a distribution for  and then setting ￿ = ￿ ￿ We assume that  is drawn from a
uniform distribution with support, [01]
Because   1 a banker must obtain a loan from a mutual fund if it is to operate
its investment technology. We suppose that the mutual fund can only observe whether the
banker￿ s project succeeds or fails. In case the project succeeds, the mutual fund cannot tell
ex post what that project￿ s value of ￿ was. As a result, the payment made by the banker to
its mutual fund can only be contingent on whether or not the banker￿ s project is successful.
We denote the interest rate paid by the banker in the event that its project succeeds by 
Because the banker has no resources in the event that its project fails, the interest rate in
that event must be zero.
35Our model is an adaptation on the model in Mankiw (1986), especially the example on page 463.
38Bankers which choose not to activate their investment projects earn  with certainty by
depositing their net worth in mutual funds. For a banker that decides to operate its project,
with probability  it earns ￿ ¬ (1 ¬ ) and with probability 1¬  it earns nothing. It is in
the household￿ s interest that each of its bankers make the project activation decision with
the objective of maximizing expected earnings. The law of large numbers and the fact that
there are many bankers in each household, guarantees that if each banker behaves in this
way, the total resources brought home by all bankers in a family is maximized. Households
are assumed to be able to compel bankers to maximize expected returns and not divert any
pro￿ts because of the assumption that households observe everything (including ￿ and )
about their bankers. Thus, a given banker invests its net worth,  in its project and borrows
1 ¬  if and only if its realized value of  satis￿es:
￿ ￿ ¬ (1 ¬ ) ￿  (5.5)
The values of  that satisfy (5.5) are as follows:
0 ￿  ￿ ￿ () ￿ () ￿
￿ ￿ ¬ 
(1 ¬ )
 (5.6)
The object, ￿ () in (5.6) summarizes several interesting features of the equilibrium.
For example, note that when  increases, bankers with higher values of  decide not to
activate their investment project (i.e., ￿ ()is decreasing in ). The reason is that under our
assumptions expected investment income is ￿xed at ￿ ￿ while bankers with high  projects are
more likely to experience success and pay  to their mutual fund. As a result, the expected
return on investment is lower for bankers with less risky investment projects, i.e., those with
high . Also, ￿ () is the fraction of bankers that invest:
Z ￿ ()
0
 = ￿ () (5.7)
Here, we have used the implication of the uniform distribution that the density of bankers
with each  2 [01] is unity. Similarly, because the quantity of goods used in each investment
project is unity, ￿ () also corresponds to the total quantity of goods invested by all bankers










Expression (5.8) re￿ ects that, among the bankers that operate their investment technologies,
the density of bankers with  2 [0 ￿ ()] is 1￿ () Finally, we show below that ￿ () is
inversely proportional to the interest rate spread, the di⁄erence between the interest rate, 
paid by bankers with successful projects and the risk free rate,  We restrict our attention
to model parameterizations that imply the e¢ cient allocations (see section 5.2.1 below) and
the equilibrium allocations are interior. This means the usual non-negativity constraints on
quantities and also, 0  ￿ ()  1
We now turn to the mutual funds. Because each mutual fund is fully diversi￿ed across
bankers, its revenues are non-random. Because we also assume mutual funds are competitive,
39it follows that their pro￿ts must be zero. A mutual fund￿ s average earnings per unit of loan
is ￿() The cost of a unit of deposits for a mutual fund is  so that the each mutual
fund￿ s zero pro￿t condition is:
￿() =  (5.9)
Much of the economics of the model are summarized in (5.9). For example, multiplying (5.8)
by  and using (5.9), we obtain a simple expression for the interest rate spread:







According to this expression, the interest rate spread is at least 2 and can be much higher.
The intuition for (5.10) is simple. Suppose all bankers activated their investment project, so
that ￿  = 1 In this case, the average probability of success is 12 (see (5.8)). With half the
bankers unable to pay, the ones that do pay must pay 2 if the mutual fund is to be able to
pay  to its depositors.36
Interestingly, (5.9) determines the equilibrium rate of interest,  in the model. To see




￿ ￿ ¬ 
1 ¬ 
=  (5.11)
where the second equality re￿ ects (5.9). Evidently,  is determined exclusively by variables
speci￿c to the loan market and not by, for example, households￿intertemporal preferences.
That the zero pro￿t condition is compatible with only one  is a striking result, though well
known in the literature on adverse selection. To understand the result requires understanding
why mutual fund revenues per loan are independent of the interest rate,  that they charge
on a loan Note that a higher  implies mutual funds earn more revenues from bankers who
borrow and repay their loan. However, this positive impact on revenues is canceled by an
adverse selection e⁄ect. Recall that when a bank raises  bankers with a high probability
of repaying their loan decide to become inactive.37 As a result, the average probability that
a banker repays the loan falls (see (5.6) and (5.7)). In principle, this need not be a problem
because the lower probability bankers also enjoy a better outcome when they are successful.
However, this is little comfort to the mutual funds in the model, because they must charge
the same interest rate,  to all borrowers. A ￿xed interest rate on loans prevents mutual
funds from sharing in the huge payo⁄s experienced when low  bankers are successful. This
is why a mutual fund￿ s revenues are independent of 
Adverse selection also explains why the revenue function, ￿(), is decreasing in  As
 increases, high  bankers switch to being inactive and this reduces the average  among
borrowers from mutual funds, reducing mutual fund revenues per unit of loan extended.
36Clearly, an empirically plausible version of our model would require a density function for  that places
greater mass on higher 
37This phenomenon is captured by a quote from Adam Smith￿ s Wealth of Nations, cited in Stiglitz and
Weiss (1992). According to Stiglitz and Weiss, Adam Smith wrote that if the interest rate was ￿xed too
high, ￿... the greater part of the money which was to be lent, would be lent to prodigals and profectors ...
Sober people, who will give for the use of money no more than a part of what they are likely to make by the
use of it, would not venture into the competition...￿
40Because  is determined by the zero pro￿t condition, in equilibrium the quantity of
saving by households adjusts passively to the  that is implied by (5.11). If, for example,
the supply of saving were perfectly elastic at an interest rate that is di⁄erent from the one
that solves (5.11), then a small perturbation in the variables (such as ) that determine
￿() would have an enormous impact on intermediation. In a one-sector model such as
ours, the notion that the supply of saving is highly inelastic seems implausible. However,
in a multi-sector (or, open economy) version of the model, the situation would be di⁄erent.
Thus, suppose that the zero pro￿t condition in (5.9) pertained to mutual funds specializing
in the supply of funds to banks in a particular sector that is small enough that it takes the
economy-wide deposit rate,  as given. In this case, the supply of funds to the particular
sector could be expected to be perfectly elastic at the interest rate,  If a decrease in net
worth,  among the bankers of the given sector drives revenues per loan (i.e., the object to
the right of the ￿rst equality in (5.11)) down, then a fall in  could cause intermediation
in that sector to collapse entirely. We do not explore the multisector version of our model
more here, though this would clearly be of interest.
Clearing in ￿nancial markets requires that the quantity of investment, ￿ () equals the
quantity of household deposits,  plus the quantity of net worth,  in the hands of bankers:
￿ () =  +  (5.12)
We now obtain a simpli￿ed expression for period 2 household income. Averaging earnings









 = ￿ ()
￿￿ ￿ ¬ ￿()(1 ¬ )
￿
+ (1 ¬ ￿ ())
(5.13)
Adding e￿ to household earnings on deposits yields the equilibrium expression for total
household income in the second period:
 + ￿ ()
￿￿ ￿ ¬ ￿()(1 ¬ )
￿
+ (1 ¬ ￿ ()) = ￿ ()￿ ￿
The expression after the equality is obtained after substituting out for  and  using (5.9)
and (5.12). The object, ￿ ()￿ ￿ represents the total period 2 output from bankers￿in-
vestment projects, in household per capita terms. Replacing total household income with
its equilibrium value of ￿ ()￿ ￿ and evaluating (5.3) at equality, we obtain the household￿ s
second period budget constraint in equilibrium:
 = ￿ ()￿ ￿ (5.14)
Consistent with Walras￿law, (5.14) is also the second period resource constraint.
We have the following de￿nition of equilibrium:
Adverse Selection Equilibrium: ￿ ￿ () such that
(i)  solve the household problem given ￿
(ii) mutual funds earn zero pro￿ts
(iii) bankers maximize expected revenues
41An equilibrium is straightforward to compute for this economy. The ￿ve equilibrium condi-
tions, (5.1), (5.2), (5.9), (5.12), and (5.14), as well as the de￿nitions of ￿ and ￿ () in (5.13)
(with ￿() de￿ned in (5.8)) and (5.6), respectively, are su¢ cient to determine the seven









￿ ￿ ¬ 
(1 ¬ )
￿ ￿ (5.16)
Use the latter expression and (5.12) to substitute out for  and  in (5.1). Solving the




  ￿ ￿ + 1
 + 
 (5.17)
with the understanding that  is determined by (5.15). With  in hand,  can be computed
from (5.16),  from (5.2),  from (5.1), ￿  from (5.6), and ￿ from (5.13) and (5.8). In this
way, all the equilibrium variables can be computed uniquely as long as the model parameters
are such that an interior equilibrium - ￿ ()  1 and   0 - exists.38
The ratio of equations (5.15) and (5.17) provide a convenient expression for the interest






  ￿ ￿ + 1
 + 
 (5.18)
According to (5.15),  falls with a decrease in  According to (5.18), this fact alone drives
the spread up. The total e⁄ect of a decrease in  on the interest rate spread also involves
the denominator in (5.18), and this drives the interest rate spread up too. We summarize
these results as follows:
Proposition 5.1. When an interior adverse selection equilibrium exists, it is unique and
characterized by (5.15), (5.16), (5.17) and the observations thereafter. The interest rate
spread, given by (5.18), rises with a reduction in 
5.2. Implications for Policy
The ￿rst subsection below discusses a planner problem for our model economy. In addition,
we use this subsection to explain why we assume the existence of an upper bound on the scale
of bankers￿projects. In the second subsection we show that two types of subsidy schemes
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
42improve the equilibrium allocations: a tax-￿nanced transfer of net worth to bankers and a
tax subsidy to mutual funds. Tax ￿nanced government deposits with the mutual funds do
not overcome the Barro-Wallace proposition. They have no e⁄ect because they do not a⁄ect
the equilibrium interest rate on bank deposits. Households respond to the increase in taxes
by reducing their deposits one-for-one with the increase in taxes and government deposits.
5.2.1. E¢ cient Allocations
We consider the allocations selected by a benevolent planner who observes a banker￿ s . We
use these allocations as a benchmark from which to evaluate the adverse selection equilibrium
and various policy interventions studied in the next section. Although here we assume the
planner observes each bank￿ s , the policy interventions studied in subsequent subsections
below do not require that policymakers observe 
The planner faces the period 1 resource constraint,
 +  ￿  (5.19)
To describe the planner￿ s decisions about which and how many projects to activate and to
derive the planner￿ s period 2 resource constraint, we ￿nd it useful to describe the model
environment using a particular ￿gure.
Figure 4 arranges all the agents in the economy in the unit square. Each point in the
square corresponds to a particular household (vertical dimension) and member of household
(horizontal dimension). There is a unit measure of households and a unit measure of members
of any given household. We suppose that the box is constructed in period 1, just after each
banker has drawn its value of  A horizontal line inside the box highlights one particular
household. The points on the line to the left of  correspond to the bankers. The points to
the right of  correspond to the workers. The bankers are ordered according to their value
of  from  = 0 to  = 1 passing from left to right. For any particular  2 [01] the banker
with that investment project is indicated by the point,  on the horizontal axis. Each point
on a vertical line through  corresponds to the bankers with the given  in the cross section
of households. Each of those bankers has the value of ￿ that is given by (5.4).
The planner must decide how many bankers in the interval, 0 to , to activate. If the
planner elects to activate a banker with a particular  it instructs all the bankers in the
cross section of households with that  to activate their project. The planner is indi⁄erent
about which projects (i.e., which ￿ s) to activate. Each project is the same to the planner
because each has the same mean productivity, ￿ ￿ and bankers su⁄er no cost to activate their
project. As a result, there is no loss of generality in simply assuming that the planner selects
bankers with ￿ s extending from  = 0 to  = ￿  for some ￿  ￿ 1 This corresponds to the
mass of bankers in the interval, 0 to ￿ , in the ￿gure.
Consider a mass of bankers on an arbitrary interval, ￿ inside [0] The resource cost of
activating these bankers in the cross section of households is the area of the rectangle with
base ￿ inside the unit square. The latter area is just ￿ itself. This re￿ ects the assumption
that there is a unit mass of households and that each project costs one unit of resources
to activate. The available net worth,  per banker, is su¢ cient to operate the bankers
corresponding to the interval, 0 to . Since these resources have no alternative use, the
planner applies them. Activating additional bankers is costly to the planner because this
43requires suppressing consumption in period 1. Suppose the planner considers activating an
additional mass,  of bankers. This corresponds to the bankers extending from the point,
 to the point,  +  in the ￿gure. Activating these bankers requires  resources. So, if
the planner wishes to activate a measure, ￿  of bankers, then  +  resources are needed,
subject to:
￿  ￿  +  (5.20)
When the planner activates bankers from 0 to ￿  the total amount of goods available in
period 2 is ￿ ￿ ￿ Thus, the second period resource constraint for the planner is:
 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (5.21)




subject to 0 ￿ ￿  ￿ 1 (5.19), (5.20), (5.21) and  ￿ 0 The unique interior solution is




















   (5.24)
with  given by solving (5.19) with equality. It is convenient to compare these allocations
with the allocations in the adverse selection equilibrium. Substituting (5.17) into (5.16) and
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Evidently, the sole factor preventing the equilibrium from replicating the planner￿ s allocations
is that the interest rate,  is too low. In the adverse selection equilibrium  is ￿ ￿(2 ¬ )
but the social rate of return on investment is ￿ ￿ With the market sending the wrong signal to
households about the return on investment, saving and investment are too low. The problem
is more severe, the smaller is .
44The ratio of investment in equilibrium to its ￿rst best level is given by dividing (5.25)
with (5.23):








From this expression, we see that equilibrium investment falls relatively more than the ￿rst
best level of investment when  decreases (here, we have used the relation between  and
 in (5.15)).
We summarize the preceding results in the form of a proposition:
Proposition 5.2. The equilibrium household deposit rate,  is less than the social return
on investment, ￿ ￿ and  falls with a reduction in  Equilibrium investment falls relatively
more than the ￿rst-best level of investment with a reduction in 
In our adverse selection model we suppose that there is an upper bound on the resources
that bankers can invest in their projects. In section B in the appendix we consider a version
of the model which does not impose an upper bound on the scale of banker projects. For
that version of the model we ￿nd:
Proposition 5.3. Suppose banker projects have constant returns and can be operated at
any scale. If there is an equilibrium, then (i) only bankers with the lowest value of  operate
their projects, (ii) the aggregate pro￿ts of these bankers is zero, (iii) the allocations in
equilibrium coincide with the ￿rst-best e¢ cient allocations and  = ￿ ￿
To help ensure the existence of an equilibrium under the assumption of Proposition 5.3 we
modify the distribution of  slightly by supposing that it has positive mass at the lower bound
of its support, and that the lower bound is a (very) small positive number. For our purposes,
property (i) renders the equilibrium of this version of our model uninteresting. Also, we
suspect that in reality investment projects have diminishing returns to scale. Although the
diminishing returns to scale implicit in our upper bound assumption for investment projects
is extreme, we ￿nd this assumption more interesting than the constant returns to scale
alternative used in proposition 5.3. Intermediate scenarios are presumably also of interest,
but we do not examine these here.
5.2.2. Interest Rate Subsidies
According to the analysis in previous subsections, the problem with the adverse selection
equilibrium is that the deposit rate,  is too low. In addition, when net worth drops, the
problem is aggravated as  falls even more and investment, relative to ￿rst-best, drops (see
Proposition 5.3). Consistent with the empirical phenomenon we seek to understand, the
interest rate spread also rises with a drop in  (see Proposition 5.1). The ine¢ ciently low
deposit rate,  re￿ ects that mutual funds do not recover the full return made possible by
their loans. This suggests two direct ways to repair the market mechanism: subsidize mutual
fund earnings or, equivalently, their cost of funds. We consider the latter here. We show
that an appropriate interest rate subsidy can make the allocations in the adverse selection
equilibrium coincide with the ￿rst-best e¢ cient allocations. Signi￿cantly, implementation of
45this policy does not require that the government observe any characteristics of the banks
that borrow from mutual funds.
Denoting the pre-tax cost of funds to the mutual fund by  the after subsidy cost under
our policy is (1 + ￿)   We suppose that this subsidy is ￿nanced by a lump sum tax
on households in the period 2, in the amount







Here, the terms in front of the square bracket represent the total amount of loans made by
the mutual funds to the active banks. The mutual funds ￿nance these loans with deposits
taken from inactive bankers and households. The amount of the subsidy is  ¬ (1 + ￿)
per unit of loans made. The household￿ s second period budget constraint, (5.3), is replaced
by
 ￿  + e￿ ¬ 
Repeating the substitutions leading up to equation (5.14), taking account of the modi￿ed
second period budget constraint of the household, we ￿nd that (5.14) continues to hold.
The impact of the tax subsidy on the equilibrium value of  is determined by studying





Substituting (5.6) and (5.8) into the latter expression and solving for  :
 =
￿ ￿(1 + ￿)
2 ¬  + ￿

Evidently, to achieve  = ￿ ￿ requires ￿ = 1
Recall that the seven conditions determining ￿ ￿ () are (5.1), (5.2), (5.9),
(5.12), (5.14), (5.13) and (5.6). We have veri￿ed that (5.14) continues to hold. Apart from
(5.9), the other conditions are obviously una⁄ected by  The only equilibrium condition
that must be adjusted is the mutual fund zero pro￿t condition, (5.9), which we replace by
(5.26). With ￿ = 1 the interest rate that solves (5.26) is the e¢ cient one,  = ￿ ￿ Given that
the other equations are una⁄ected, it follows from the discussion in the previous subsection
that the e¢ cient allocations are supported by the subsidy policy. We summarize this result
in a proposition:
Proposition 5.4. With an interest cost subsidy, ￿ = 1 the allocations in the adverse
selection equilibrium are e¢ cient.
5.2.3. Tax Financed Transfers to Bankers
Here, we consider a policy of raising lump sum taxes,  on households in period 1 and
transferring  to each banker. By setting
 = (1 ¬ ) (5.27)
46the transfer ensures that each banker has enough funds to fully ￿nance its investment project.
With this policy the ￿nancial frictions are completely circumvented. To see this, note that
the value of  which satis￿es the mutual fund zero pro￿t condition, (5.9), is still the one
in (5.15), except that  is replaced by the post-transfer level of banker￿ s net worth. Since
that is unity under the tax-transfer scheme, we have that  = ￿ ￿ its value in the e¢ cient
equilibrium. It is also straightforward to verify that   and ￿  satisfy (5.23). We have
assumed that model parameters imply ￿  ￿ 1 When ￿   1 then   0 That is, in this case
some of the net worth transferred to bankers is recycled back to households through the loan
market.
We summarize these results as follows:
Proposition 5.5. Under the tax-transfer scheme in (5.27), the allocations in the adverse
selection equilibrium are e¢ cient.
A problem with the tax-transfer scheme considered in this section is that it presses hard
on a feature of the model in which we have little con￿dence. In particular, we assume
that it is known how much net worth each banker has and how much they need for their
investment project. In practice, these assumptions may be di¢ cult to assess. In addition,
our environment abstracts from any problems associated with distributing wealth between
bankers and other agents. These would have to be considered in case such a policy were
actually implemented.
5.2.4. Tax-￿nanced Government Deposits in Banks
Suppose the government levies a lump-sum tax,  on households in period 1, deposits the
proceeds in a bank and then transfers the earnings,  on the deposits to households in
period 2. It is easy to see that this has no impact on allocations, as long as the policy does not
drive the economy into a boundary. The equations that characterize an interior equilibrium
are (5.1), (5.2), (5.9), (5.12), (5.14), (5.13), (5.6), (5.8) (see the discussion after the de￿nition
of equilibrium in section 5.1). The new policy simply requires replacing  with + in (5.1),
(5.9), (5.12). If  is increased, then  falls by the same amount. Total investment in period
1, consumption in the two periods and the interest rate,  do not change. Although a drop
in net worth makes the banking system more dysfunctional, a policy of tax-￿nanced loans
to banks has no impact.
6. Asymmetric Information and Monitoring Costs
This section presents a version of the model in the previous sections, in which the ￿nancial
friction on the liability side of banks￿balance sheets stems from an asymmetric information
problem similar to the one studied in BGG.39 As in the previous sections, we assume the
trigger for the crisis is a fall in the net worth of banks. Our environment is well suited to
contemplating the e⁄ects of an increase in a particular type of microeconomic uncertainty,
and so we consider this as an additional trigger for the crisis. Like the model in the previous
39For other asymmetric information and monitoring cost models applied speci￿cally to banking, see Hi-
rakata, Sudo and Ueda (2009a,b, 2010), Nowobilski (2011) and Zeng (2011).
47section (though unlike our ￿rst two models), the model analyzed here does not display
the nonlinearity of a sharp dichotomy between ￿ normal￿and ￿ crisis￿times. This is because
equilibrium conditions of the model do not include equations that are satis￿ed as strict
equalities for some values of the state and strict inequalities for other values of the state. As
a result, we simply de￿ne a normal time as one in which banking net worth is high and a
crisis time as one in which net worth is substantially lower.
We now provide a sketch of the model, which most closely resembles the setup in the
previous section. There are two periods. A large number of workers and bankers with
identical utility functions live in a representative, competitive household. Workers have an
exogenous endowment,  of income in the ￿rst period, while bankers possess  units of net
worth. All variables are expressed in household per capita units. Households allocate  to
￿rst period household consumption and to deposits in identical, competitive mutual funds.
Each banker combines its net worth with a loan from a mutual fund to acquire the securities
of one ￿rm. The ￿rm operates a technology perturbed by an idiosyncratic technology shock
to build capital in period 1, and uses the capital in period 2 to produce goods. Because we
assume markets are competitive and because ￿rms contribute nothing themselves to building
capital and selling goods, they enjoy zero earnings after paying the return on the security
sold to their bank. Because a bank can invest in the securities of at most one ￿rm, the asset
side of a bank￿ s balance sheet is risky. As in the previous section, we simplify the exposition
by pretending that a ￿rm￿ s activity building capital and selling goods is undertaken directly
by its bank.
A ￿nancial friction arises because the bank observes the realization of the idiosyncratic
technology shock on the asset side of its balance sheet, while its mutual fund can observe the
technology shock only by paying a monitoring cost. The loan received by banks from their
mutual fund comes in the form of a standard debt contract. The contract speci￿es a loan
amount and an interest rate. Banks with a su¢ ciently low realization of their idiosyncratic
productivity shock are not be able to repay their loan and these banks must transfer whatever
assets they have to their mutual fund after being monitored. The measure of microeconomic
uncertainty referred to in the opening paragraph pertains to the variance across banks in
their idiosyncratic technology shock. We consider a characterization of the ￿nancial crisis
that involves just a drop in bank net worth, as one that also involves an increase in the cross-
sectional variance of the technology shock. Household consumption in the second period is
￿nanced out of income on period 1 deposits as well as bank pro￿ts.
The model implies that a fall in bank net worth causes interest rate spreads - the cost of
funds to banks minus the risk-free rate - to rise and investment to fall. We consider various
policy responses. We ￿nd that a policy that subsidizes the cost of funds to banks is welfare
improving in both normal and crisis times. Moreover, the optimal value of the subsidy is
greater in crisis times, so that the model suggests a more aggressive policy stance then. We
also ￿nd that, absent government intervention, bank leverage is too low. In this sense, the
model does not include the kind of features that rationalize the current interest in imposing
leverage restrictions on economic agents. The reason for our ￿ underborrowing￿result is that
the marginal return on loans by mutual funds to banks is higher than the average return,
while the economics of the model implies that bank creditors focus on the average return.
Next, we show that the Barro-Wallace irrelevance result applies for loans made by the
government to banks. We also show that a su¢ ciently large tax-￿nanced transfer of net
48worth to bankers allows the economy to support the ￿rst-best equilibrium outcomes. Since
the model abstracts from the income distribution consequences of this type of policy, we
only think of the result as illustrating the logic of the model. The latter result is reported
in Proposition C.4 in Appendix C.2.6.
Although the model framework into which we insert the BGG-type ￿nancial frictions in
this section has the virtue of consistency with the other models in the paper, it has one
potential drawback. In our framework, the price of capital is always unity, while in the
literature (see, e.g., BGG or Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003, 2010, 2011)), the price
of capital is endogenous. Moreover, the recent literature on pecuniary externalities (see
Bianchi (2011), Korinek (2011), Lorenzoni (2008) and Mendoza (2009)) raise the possibility
that there is overborrowing when banker net worth is in part a function of the market price of
an asset like capital (see, e.g., Bianchi (2011) and Mendoza (2009)). These ￿ndings motivate
us to investigate the robustness of our underborrowing result to endogenizing the price of
capital the way it is done in BGG. We do so by introducing curvature into the technology for
converting consumption goods into capital. Because capital is the only source of net worth
for bankers, the change introduces the type of pecuniary externality studied in the literature.
We display numerical results which suggest that our underborrowing result in fact is robust
to this change.
6.1. Banks and Mutual Funds
The typical banker takes its net worth,  and approaches a mutual fund for a loan,  The
bank combines its net worth and the loan to produce output in period 2 using the following
production function:
 ( + )
 (6.1)




 () = 1 (6.2)
where  is the cdf of .
Before the realization of the bank￿ s productivity shock, the bank and its mutual fund
have the same information about  Both know the shock will be drawn from  After
the realization of the shock, the bank and the mutual fund are asymmetrically informed.
The bank observes the realization of its , but the bank￿ s mutual fund can only observe the
shock by paying a monitoring cost. Townsend (1979) showed that under these circumstances
a ￿ standard debt contract￿works well. Under such a contract, the bank pays the mutual fund
an amount,  in period 2 if it is able to do so. Given  some banks experience such a low
 that they are not be able to repay  Under a standard debt contract, those banks are
￿ bankrupt￿ . The mutual fund associated with such a bank veri￿es bankruptcy by undertaking
costly monitoring,
￿! ( + )

where ￿  0 is a parameter. A bankrupt bank transfers everything it has,  ( + ) to
its mutual fund.
49The cuto⁄level of productivity, ￿  that separates the bankrupt and non-bankrupt banks
is de￿ned by:
￿  ( + )



















Evidently, as  ! 1 ￿  converges to a constant, i.e., the value of  that a bank with no net
worth needs to be able to pay back its debt.






 ( + )
 ¬ 
￿




[ ¬ ￿ ] ()
￿
 (6.5)





[ ¬ ￿ ] () = 
 (1 ¬ ¬(￿ )) (6.6)
where




The bank maximizes (6.6) and remits all its pro￿ts to its household. The banker does so in
exchange for perfect consumption insurance. It is in the interest of the household that each of
its banks maximize expected returns because, by the law of large numbers, this implies that
bankers as a group maximize the total resources brought home to the household in period
2. Households can observe everything about their own banks (including ) and we make the
(standard) assumption that what is observable is enforceable. That is, the household has
the means to make sure that each of its bankers actually maximizes (6.6) and does not, for
example, divert any proceeds towards private consumption.
From (6.6) and the observation about ￿  for large  we see that the banker￿ s objective
is unbounded above in  for any given  and  As a result, we cannot use the classic
Marshallian demand and supply paradigm in which the banker takes  as given and chooses
a loan amount,  To describe our market arrangement, we must ￿rst discuss the situation
of the banks￿creditors, mutual funds.
There is a large number of identical and competitive mutual funds, each of which makes
loans to banks and takes deposits from households. Because mutual funds are diversi￿ed,
there is no risk on the asset side of their balance sheet. Although a mutual fund does not
know whether any particular bank will fully repay its loan, the mutual fund knows exactly
how much it will receive from its banks as a group. Because there is no risk on the asset
side of the balance sheet, it is feasible for mutual funds to commit in period 1 to paying
50households a ￿xed and certain gross rate of interest,  on their deposits in period 2. Because
mutual funds are competitive, they take  as given. A mutual fund that makes size  loans
to each of a large number of banks earns the following per bank:




 ( + )
Here, the term before the plus sign corresponds to the revenues received from banks that are
not bankrupt, i.e., those with  ￿ ￿  The term after the plus sign indicates receipts, net of
monitoring costs, received from banks that cannot fully repay their loan Since the cost of
funds is  the mutual fund￿ s zero pro￿t condition is (using (6.3)):
[1 ¬  (￿ )] ￿  ( + )




 ( + ) = 
or,
[¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
 ( + )

=  (6.8)
An important feature of this environment is that the interest rate paid to households is
proportional to the average return,  ( + ) on loans and not, say, to the marginal
return. We discuss the policy implications of this feature, evident from (6.8), below. Mutual
funds are indi⁄erent between loan contracts, as long as they satisfy the above zero pro￿t
condition.
Expression (6.8) motivates the market arrangement that we adopt. Let the combinations
of ￿  and  that satisfy (6.8) de￿ne a ￿ menu￿of loan contracts that is available to banks, for




 [¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
 (6.9)
Banks take   and  as given and select the contract, ( ￿ ) from this menu which max-
imizes expected pro￿ts, (6.6). Using (6.9) to substitute out for  in the banker￿ s objective,
the problem reduces to one of choosing ￿  to maximize:

 1 ¬ ¬(￿ )
1 ¬ 
 [¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )]

The ￿rst order necessary condition for optimization problem is:
1 ¬  (￿ )
1 ¬ ¬(￿ )
=

 [1 ¬  (￿ ) ¬ ￿￿  0 (￿ )]
1 ¬ 
 [¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
 (6.10)
which can be solved for ￿  given 41 Given the solution for ￿   solves (6.9) and  solves
(6.3).




fact that  and  are exogenous to the banks at the time the contract is undertaken.
41Here, we have used ¬0 (￿ ) = 1 ¬  (￿ ) and 0 (￿ ) = ￿ 0 (￿ ) See BGG for a formal discussion of the
fact that (6.10) uniquely characterizes the solution to the bank optimization problem. A su¢ cient condition
is the regularity condition de￿ned in (6.23) below.
51A notable feature of the contract is that  and  are independent of net worth, 
That is, if banks had di⁄erent levels of net worth, the theory as stated predicts that each
bank in the cross section receives a loan contract specifying the same leverage and rate of
interest. This feature of the model re￿ ects the assumption that all banks draw  from the
same distribution,  In a more realistic setting, di⁄erent banks would draw from di⁄erent
￿ s and they would receive di⁄erent debt contracts.
6.2. Households and Government
In period 1 the household budget constraint is:
 +  ￿  (6.11)
where ,   denote consumption, deposits in mutual funds and an endowment of output,
 Expression (6.11) is also the period 1 resource constraint. The second period budget
constraint of the household is
 ￿ (1 + ￿) + ￿ ¬ 
where  denotes period 2 consumption,  denotes lump sum taxes, ￿ denotes a subsidy
on household saving and ￿ denotes the pro￿ts brought home by bankers.42 Households
maximize utility,
() + ￿() (6.12)




 ￿  0
The government￿ s budget constraint is:
 = ￿ (6.13)
The second period resource constraint is obtained from the household budget constraint by
substituting out for ￿ from (6.6),  from (6.8) and  from (6.13), to obtain the second
period resource constraint:
 ￿ 
 ( + )[1 ¬ ￿G(￿ )] (6.14)
According to (6.14), period 2 consumption is no greater than total output, net of the output
used up in monitoring by mutual funds.
42As noted previously, by the law of large numbers the expected pro￿ts of individual banks, what we
de￿ned in (6.6) as ￿ also corresponds to aggregate pro￿ts (in per capita terms) for all the banks in the
household.
526.3. Equilibrium
We de￿ne an equilibrium as follows:
De￿nition 6.1. For given ￿ a private sector equilibrium is a ( ￿ ) such that
(i) The household problem is solved (see section 6.2)
(ii) The problem of the bank is solved (see section 6.1)
(iii) Mutual fund pro￿ts are zero (see section 6.1)
(iv) The government budget constraint is satis￿ed (see section 6.2)
(v) The ￿rst and second period resource constraints are satis￿ed.
For convenience, we collect the equations that characterize a private sector equilibrium
here:
Equation number Equation Economic description
 = (￿ [1 + ￿])
1
￿ household ￿rst order condition
(6.14)  =  [ + ][1 ¬ ￿G(￿ )] period 2 resource constraint





 [1¬(￿ )¬￿￿ 0(￿ )]
1¬ 




 [¬(￿ )¬￿G(￿ )] mutual fund zero pro￿t condition
(6.15)
These equations represent 5 equations in 5 private sector equilibrium objects:
 ￿  (6.16)
The equilibrium value of  can be backed out by imposing either the household or government
budget constraint. Note too that the rate of interest on banks,  is determined from (6.3).
6.4. Implications for Policy
The ￿rst part of this section shows that the equilibrium in our economy is characterized by
too little borrowing, so that subsidizing the cost of funds to banks is welfare improving. We
then show that a policy of extending loans directly to banks fails to overcome the Barro-
Wallace irrelevance result, and so has no impact.
6.4.1. Subsidizing the Cost of Funds to Banks and Leverage Restrictions
Interest rate subsidies are desirable from a welfare point of view because they correct a par-
ticular ine¢ ciency in the model economy. Households make their deposit decision treating 
as the marginal return on a deposit. However, the structure of ￿nancial markets is such that
 corresponds to the average, not the marginal, return on loans to banks. Not surprisingly,
a planner prefers that household deposit decisions be made based on the marginal return.
We show that in our environment, the marginal return on loans is higher than the average
return, so that the market signal received by the households,  does not provide them with
an appropriately strong incentive to save. An interest rate subsidy corrects this problem.
53In the second subsection we turn to quantitative simulations. In view of the results
in the previous paragraph, it is perhaps not surprising that restrictions on leverage in the
model reduce welfare. We ￿nd that the market ine¢ ciency in the model - the excess of the
marginal return on loans over the average return - increases in a crisis time. As a result,
the interest rate subsidy ought to be expanded substantially then. In addition, the e¢ cient
policy expands leverage by a greater percent in a crisis time than in normal times.
Qualitative Analysis A private sector equilibrium is de￿ned conditional on a particular
value of ￿ If we treat ￿ as an undetermined variable, then the system is underdetermined:
there are many equilibria, one for each possible value of ￿ The Ramsey equilibrium is





subject to (6.14), (6.11), (6.10), (6.9) and the household intertemporal ￿rst order condition.
The latter is non-binding as it can simply be used to de￿ne ￿ without placing any limitation
on the maximization problem. Making use of the latter observation, and substituting out for
 and  using (6.14), (6.11), the Ramsey equilibrium allocations can be found by solving:
max
￿ 
( ¬ ) + ￿
¬

 [ + ][1 ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
￿
 (6.17)
subject to (6.10), (6.9). It is convenient to further simplify the problem by solving (6.9) for
 and using the result to substitute out for  in (6.10):
1 ¬  (￿ )
1 ¬ ¬(￿ )
=
() ¬ 1
[¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
[1 ¬  (￿ ) ¬ ￿￿ 
0 (￿ )] (6.18)





Equation (6.18) de￿nes a mapping from  to ￿  Denote this mapping by ￿  ()43 Substitute
￿  () into (6.17) and the Ramsey problem reduces to the following:44
max

( ¬ ) + ￿
¬

 [ + ][1 ¬ ￿G(￿  ())]
￿





 f1 ¬ ￿[(￿  ()) + ( + )
0 (￿  ()) ￿ 
0 ()]g ￿ 
 (6.20)
say. The term,  denotes the marginal social return on loans.
43In the numerical examples we have studied, we have found that when there exists a value of ￿  that solves
(6.18) for a given  that value of ￿  is unique
44We generally ignore imposing the usual non-negativity constraints such as  ￿ 0 ¬ ￿ 0 to minimize
clutter and in the hope that this does not generate confusion. Throughout, we assume that model parameters
are set so that non-negativity constraints are non-binding.
54Once the Ramsey problem is solved, the remaining objects in Ramsey equilibrium can
be found as follows. The cost of funds to mutual funds,  is obtained by computing the




[¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
Here, we have used (6.8) and (6.19). The saving subsidy, ￿ is computed so that the house-
hold￿ s saving decision is based on the marginal return on loans,  and not the average
return,  :

 = (1 + ￿) (6.21)
Two features of (6.20) deserve emphasis. First,  is the return to loans in the ￿ ￿rst best￿




subject to:  +  ￿   = 
 [ + ]
This is the problem in which allocations are chosen by a planner that can observe each
bank￿ s productivity shock, . In this problem, there are no monitoring costs. The object in
braces in (6.20) represents a wedge introduced by the presence of asymmetric information.
A second interesting feature of (6.20) is that the solution to the Ramsey problem implies
￿  0 This is because the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption is
equated with the marginal return to loans in the Ramsey problem,  while in the private
sector equilibrium with ￿ = 0 it is equated to the average return on loans,  (recall the
discussion surrounding (6.8).)45 Proposition C.1 in section C.1 of the Appendix establishes
that under a certain regularity condition,    so that marginal return on loans exceeds
the corresponding average return. Thus, by (6.21), ￿  0 To de￿ne the regularity condition,
let the hazard rate be denoted as follows:
(￿ ) ￿
 0(￿ )
1 ¬ (￿ )
 (6.22)
The regularity condition is
￿ (￿ ) increasing in ￿  (6.23)
BGG study (6.23) and argue that it is satis￿ed when  corresponds to the lognormal distri-
bution.
Although we assume ￿  0 in our model, it is interesting to consider the limiting case,
￿ ! 0 In this case,  =  according to (6.10) But, (6.20) implies  =  when ￿ = 0 so
we conclude that in this case the average and marginal returns coincide. That is, if ￿ = 0
then ￿ = 0 in the Ramsey equilibrium.
We summarize the preceding results in the form of a proposition:
Proposition 6.2. Suppose ￿  0 and condition (6.23) holds. Then, the interest rate sub-
sidy, ￿ is positive in a Ramsey equilibrium. This re￿ ects that (i) the household bases its
45In his analysis of costly state veri￿cation problems, Fisher (1999) also emphasizes that the quantity of
lending is determined by the average, not the marginal, return on a loan.
55saving decision on the after tax average return on deposits, (1 + ￿) while the Ramsey
planner wishes that the household base its saving decision on the corresponding marginal
return,  and (ii)   . Suppose ￿ = 0 Then  = ; ￿ = 0 in a Ramsey equilibrium;
and the allocations in a private sector equilibrium with ￿ = 0 are ￿rst-best.
Quantitative Analysis We construct several numerical examples to illustrate the ob-
servations in the previous subsection. We suppose that the cumulative distribution of 
denoted by  is lognormal. This distribution has two parameters,  log and
￿
2 ￿  (log)
The assumption,  = 1 implies  log = ¬￿22 so ￿ is the only free parameter in 
The baseline values of our model parameters are displayed in Table 1. These parameter
values were chosen in part to ensure a bankruptcy rate of 4 percent, i.e.,  (￿ ) = 004 a
leverage ratio,  = 2 and  = 101 when ￿ = 0 The value of  (￿ ) that we use is about
one percentage point higher than what appears in the literature (see Christiano, Motto and
Rostagno (2010) for a review). That literature uses models that are speci￿ed at a quarterly
frequency. Given our setting of ￿ we are tempted to interpret the period in the model as
one year, in which case our speci￿cation of  (￿ ) is somewhat low relative to the literature.
However, given that the model has only two periods it is unclear how to compare the time
dimension of the model with the quarterly time dimension in empirical models. In light
of these considerations, we decided to use a relatively conventional value for  (￿ ) in our
calibration. Our value of ￿ is also within the range used in the literature. We select values
for ￿  and ￿  so that (6.10), (6.9) and the calibrated value of  (￿ ) are satis￿ed. The
resulting value of ￿ reported in Table 1, is within the range used in the literature.
As in other sections of the paper, we capture the onset of the crisis with an exogenous
drop in .46 The quantitative properties of the model are displayed in Table 2. Panel A
in that table displays the properties of the model under the benchmark parameterization.
This is our characterization of the economy in a ￿ normal￿time. Panels B and C display
two representations of our model economy in a ￿ crisis￿time. Panel B corresponds to the
case where  is reduced. Our second representation of a crisis is that the drop in  is
accompanied by a 20 percent rise in ￿ We are interested in this representation as a way to
capture casual evidence that there was a general increase in ￿ uncertainty￿during the crisis.
The results for this case are reported in Panel C. In each panel, the column labelled ￿ ￿ = 0￿
displays the private sector equilibrium with ￿ = 0 The column, ￿ Ramsey￿ , indicates the
equilibrium with the Ramsey-optimal ￿ Finally, the column marked ￿ First Best￿indicates
the ￿rst best allocations.
Note from Panel A that in normal times the Ramsey interest rate subsidy, ￿ is 0.3
percent. Thus, consistent with Proposition 6.2, in normal times the marginal return on
investment exceeds the average return. Because equilibrium saving increases in the subsidy,
saving and investment are both higher in the Ramsey equilibrium than they are with ￿ = 0
The increased supply of saving reduces the equilibrium interest rate,  so that ￿ is e⁄ectively
a subsidy to banks￿cost of funds. The interest rate spread is slightly higher in the Ramsey
46See Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) and Shimer (2010) for other studies that model the shock that triggers
the recent ￿nancial crisis as a drop in wealth.
56equilibrium than it is in the private sector equilibrium with ￿ = 0 This re￿ ects that loans
to banks are larger in the Ramsey equilibrium, so that monitoring costs associated with
bankruptcies are larger.
We now turn to Panel B. With the drop in  the economy is poorer and so we expect
substantial e⁄ects, even in the ￿rst best allocations. According to Panel B, the ￿rst best
level of consumption in the ￿rst and second periods drops. There is a rise in household
saving in response to the shock, but the rise is smaller than the fall in  so that investment
drops. In terms of the response in the private sector equilibrium with ￿ = 0 note that there
is a substantial jump in the interest rate spread, from 1.23 percent to 7.83 percent. This
jump is associated with a very large rise in bankruptcies, from 4 percent to 21 percent. In
addition, consumption in both periods and investment all drop by large amounts. In terms
of interest rates and quantities, the drop in  generates a response qualitatively similar to
what we found in the previous models.
In terms of policy, the optimal interest rate subsidy rises more than 5-fold in response to
the drop in . The intervention reduces the cost of funds to banks ( falls an additional
9 basis points in the Ramsey equilibrium, compared to the ￿ = 0 equilibrium). Thus, this
model shares the implication of the other models in this paper which indicate that a ￿ crisis￿
triggered by a fall in net worth justi￿es a policy of (increased) interest rate subsidies to
banks.
For the results in Panel C, we set  = 12 and ￿ = 12￿037 where 0.37 is the value of
￿ in the baseline parameterization (see Table 1). Of course, this change in our experiment
has no impact on the ￿rst best allocations.
The jump in ￿ causes the interest rate spread to jump by nearly 5 percentage points in
both the ￿ = 0 and Ramsey equilibria. In addition, investment is reduced, though only by
a small amount. Note that the increase in ￿ produces a period 1 rise in consumption. This
happens because the increase in ￿ exacerbates the ￿nancial frictions and induces substitu-
tion away from activities (investment) that involve ￿nance and towards activities (period
1 consumption) that do not. Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2011), who incorporate the
￿nancial frictions described here into a dynamic model, ￿nd that ￿ uctuations in ￿ account
for a substantial portion of business cycle ￿ uctuations. This is because other features of
their dynamic general equilibrium model reverse our model￿ s prediction that consumption
and investment comove negatively in response to disturbances in ￿
Turning to the implications for policy, note in Panel C that the ￿ shock magni￿es the rise
in the Ramsey tax subsidy rate. Thus, an increase in uncertainty calls for a greater subsidy
to banks￿cost of funds and, hence, more leverage.
In sum, the numerical analysis shows that, at a qualitative level, the model of this section
rationalizes the view that a drop in net worth reduces investment, raises interest rate spreads
and warrants interest rate subsidies to banks.
6.4.2. Government Loans and Net Worth Transfers to Banks
We consider a government policy that raises a lump sum tax,  on households in the ￿rst
period. It then lends  to banks using the same technology available to mutual funds and
transfers the proceeds to households in the second period in the form of a lump sum tax
rebate. We show that this policy has no impact on equilibrium allocations because it simply
57displaces, one-for-one, private saving. That is, the Barro-Wallace irrelevance result holds for
government purchases of the ￿nancial assets of ￿nancial businesses. Tax-￿nanced transfers
of net worth to banks do help. Indeed, if they are carried out on the right scale then banks
do not require credit and the ￿rst-best allocations are supported. This result, which is not
surprising, is proved in appendix section C.2.6.
We suppose that the government and mutual funds o⁄er the same menu of loan contracts
to banks. Because banks are all identical, each chooses the same loan contract, regardless of
whether they borrow from mutual funds or the government. That is, each receives the same
leverage and interest rate, characterized by (6.9) and (6.10). Denote the fraction of banks
which receive their loans from mutual funds by ￿, while the complementary fraction receives
their loans from the government. Thus, the net worth of banks receiving their loans from
mutual funds and the government is ￿ and (1 ¬ ￿) respectively.47
In the ￿rst period, the representative household deposits  with the banking system. The
household￿ s ￿rst-period budget constraint is
 +  +  ￿  (6.24)
Expression (6.24) is also the period 1 resource constraint. The household￿ s second period
budget constraint is:
 ￿  + government lump sum taxes+banker earnings
By the zero pro￿t condition of private mutual funds, household deposits generate the follow-
ing return in equilibrium:
 = 
 (￿ + )[¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
The banks ￿nanced by mutual funds return the following pro￿ts to the households:

 (￿ + )[1 ¬ ¬(￿ )]
Thus, household income from deposits plus the pro￿ts generated by the bankers ￿nanced by
those deposits is:
 + 
 (￿ + )[1 ¬ ¬(￿ )] = 
 (￿ + )[1 ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
Similarly, the households receive a tax rebate from the government plus pro￿ts from the
bankers ￿nanced by the government, in the amount:

 ((1 ¬ ￿) + )[1 ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
Then, total household income in the second period is:

 [(￿ + ) + ((1 ¬ ￿) + )][1 ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
= 
 ( +  + )[1 ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
47Recall that all variables are in household per capita terms.
58Combining the household￿ s budget constraint with the equilibrium expressions for banker
pro￿ts and deposit interest, we obtain the second period resource constraint:
 ￿ 
 ( +  + )[1 ¬ ￿G(￿ )] (6.25)
The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an (interior) household optimum are that the ￿rst
and second period budget constraints (i.e., (6.24) and (6.25)) hold with equality and that
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption be equated to the household
deposit rate, . These three conditions coincide with the ￿rst three equations in (6.15) if
we identify  with  +  and we set ￿ = 0.
Thus, the equilibrium allocations of the model in this subsection are determined recur-
sively. The ￿ve equations in (6.15) with ￿ = 0 determine the ￿ve equilibrium objects in
(6.16). Private lending,  is then determined by  =  ¬  If the government increases
loans,  to bankers, then household loans to bankers via mutual funds are reduced by the
same amount. Of course, this assumes (as we do throughout this paper) that we only con-
sider interior equilibria. For example, if    then the non-negativity constraint,  ￿ 0
would be binding and we expect the tax policy to have real e⁄ects.48 We state this result in
the form of a proposition:
Proposition 6.3. Suppose the government has the same technology for making loans to
banks as do mutual funds. Then in an interior equilibrium, tax ￿nanced government loans
to bankers have no impact on rates of return, asset prices, consumption and investment.
Of course, this proposition is not true if there are di⁄erences between the loans provided
by the government and those provided by mutual funds. We suspect that interesting asym-
metries would involve the government having a less e¢ cient technology for making loans
than mutual funds have. If so, then we conjecture that social welfare would be reduced with
an increase in  Thus the environment of this section, in contrast to the one in section 3,
appears to provide little rationale for government purchases of securities issued by ￿nancial
businesses.
6.5. Pecuniary Externalities: A Robustness Check
A recent literature emphasizes the importance of pecuniary externalities that occur when
expenditures are constrained by the market value of agents￿assets and the market price of
assets is endogenous. Our setting incorporates collateral constraints, but our assumptions
about technology imply that asset prices are ￿xed. Here, we report calculations that suggest
the conclusions of our analysis are robust to endogenizing asset prices. In particular, we
show that the ￿ underborrowing￿property of the model is robust to endogenizing asset prices,
as is the result that it is desirable to subsidize the interest rate costs of banks.
We consider a sequence of economies, starting with our baseline speci￿cation in which the
technology for converting banker resources,  +  into productive capital is linear. In the
baseline speci￿cation, the price of capital is unity. When there is curvature in the technology
for producing capital the price of capital becomes endogenous and in principle this introduces
48We suspect that the environment of this section is not an interesting one for considering equilbria in
which the constraint,  ￿ 0 is binding.
59a pecuniary externality. We established in Proposition 6.2 above that in our baseline linear
case the equilibrium is characterized by under-borrowing by banks and mutual funds and
under-saving by households. We ￿nd that when curvature in the production of capital
is increased the optimal value of the subsidy, ￿ at ￿rst increases, so that underborrowing
becomes even more severe. For yet higher levels of curvature, the optimal value of the subsidy
converges slowly to zero from above, so that the underborrowing result is attenuated. On
net, our numerical results indicate that our underborrowing result is robust to all but the
very highest levels of curvature. And even then, we never ￿nd overborrowing.
To explain our results, we now indicate the key features of the modi￿ed model, which we
adapt from BGG. In particular, in the version of the model with endogenous capital prices
bankers are endowed with a quantity of capital, , at the beginning of the period. As in BGG,
bankers sell this capital to capital producers for a price,  This price de￿nes banker net
worth,  =  Capital producers operate a technology which combines  with investment
goods to produce and sell new capital,  at a price,  The technology operated by capital
producers is





 0 ￿   ￿ 1
Banks go to mutual funds with their net worth and obtain a standard debt contract with
loan amount, . They purchase  using this loan and their net worth, subject to:
 ￿  + 
The banker operates a production technology analogous to the one in (6.1) and (6.2):


where  is distributed as in (6.2) and  is a ￿xed parameter. With our modi￿cation, the
prices of old and new capital,  and  are endogenous. The rate of return on capital, 






Now, suppose a mutual fund deviates from the standard debt contract and makes an
additional loan to one particular bank. This has two e⁄ects that may involve pecuniary
externalities. First, when the banker uses the loan to purchase new capital, its price, 
is driven up by a small amount. This encourages capital production and leads to a rise in
 thus raising the net worth of other bankers and raising the value of their net worth. As
a result, the other bankers are able to borrow more too. The second e⁄ect of extending a
loan to a banker is that the things the banker buys (in this case, ) become more expensive
(i.e.,  increases). Note that the two e⁄ects work against each other. Depending on the
relative strengths of the two e⁄ects, various results could occur in principle. The details of
the modi￿ed model economy are presented in Appendix C.
We now report our quantitative experiment. We solved for the Ramsey optimal subsidy
rate, ￿ for 001 ￿   ￿ 1 holding all other parameters ￿xed at their baseline level (see Table
1). Figure 5 displays the computed values of ￿ Note that as   decreases, the ine¢ ciency
of the economy initially increases since ￿ increases. However, for   below roughly 0.85, the
60ine¢ ciency of equilibrium decreases monotonically with additional reductions in    For   near
0.3, the ine¢ ciency is virtually completely eliminated since the Ramsey optimal ￿ is close
to zero. We interpret the ￿nding, ￿ ￿ 0 as indicating the robustness of our underborrowing
result and of our result concerning the desirability of subsidizing banks￿cost of funds.
7. Concluding Remarks
In the past decade, DSGE models have been constructed that have proved useful for analyzing
questions of interest to policy makers.49 In recent years, the Federal Reserve has undertaken
various actions - a large scale asset purchase program, reductions in banks￿cost of funds -
with the objective of correcting dysfunctions in credit markets. The DSGE models developed
to place structure on the policy discussions before 2007 are silent on the rationale, design
and appropriate scale of recent policy actions. DSGE models must integrate the right sort
of ￿nancial frictions to be useful given the new policy questions. This paper surveys four
candidate models and summarizes some of their implications for recent policy actions.
49See Christiano, Trabant and Walentin (2011) for a review.
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65Technical Appendix
A. Notes on the Unobserved E⁄ort Model
A.1. Computational Strategy for Solving the Baseline Model
Computing an equilibrium when the cash constraint, (4.8), is not binding (i.e., ￿ = 0) is
straightforward. Here, we describe an algorithm for computing an equilibrium when the cash
constraint is binding, so that ￿  0 There are ten equilibrium conditions. This includes
the six conditions associated with the banks, (4.21), the three conditions associated with
household optimization, (4.3), (4.2) and (4.16) and the de￿nition of ￿; the marginal utility






When ￿  0 the  and ￿ equilibrium conditions associated with the banks can simpli￿ed
and we do so ￿rst.




 ( + )










Use this expression to substitute out for 
 ¬ 




















Use this expression to substitute out for () in (A.1) and use the ￿ equation to substitute
out for 











￿  ¬  (+)







, collect terms in  and rearrange, to obtain the adjustment to the ￿ equa-
tion that is possible when ￿ 6= 0 :





 ¬  (A.2)
66The equilibrium conditions associated with the banks, with the appropriate adjustments
that are possible when ￿ 6= 0 are:








 + ￿ = 0 (A.3)
 :  = ()




 : ￿() = ￿￿b
￿ :  = ()

 + (1 ¬ ())











 ( + )
To solve this system, ￿x    Solve for ￿;    using (4.17) and the household equations,
(4.3), (4.2), (4.16). Compute 
 using the ￿ equation. Compute  using the ￿ equation.
Compute 
 using the ￿ equation. Adjust the value of  until the  equation is satis￿ed.
To investigate the possibility of multiple equilibria, we considered values of  on a ￿ne grid
over a wide range of values and it appeared that there is only one value of  that satis￿es
the  equation. Finally, the  and 
 equations can be used to solve linearly for ￿ and ￿
















This completes the discussion of computing the equilibrium.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 4.5
In this appendix, we prove a slightly more precise statement of Proposition 4.5 in section
4.5.2. Let
 ￿  + 
Then:
Proposition A.1. Let  and  0 denote two di⁄erent levels of tax-￿nanced equity ￿nance.
￿ Equilibrium is characterized by the following invariance property. If ￿
satis￿es the equilibrium conditions under  then ￿ also satis￿es the equi-
librium conditions under  0 as long as ￿  0 in both cases.
￿ In addition, (i) while ￿  0 ￿ is monotone increasing in  and (ii) there is a  large
enough, say  ￿, such  ￿   and ￿ = 0 for    ￿  ￿.
It is worth stressing that the invariance property applies only to ￿ and not to






67The equilibrium values of the variables in (A.4) do change with  when ￿  0 We now
prove the above proposition.
The four equilibrium conditions associated with the household are given by (4.17), (4.27),
(4.28) and (4.2):
 = ( +  + )
 =  +  + 





Note that if ￿; solve these equations for one value of  then the same ￿;
solve these equations for another value of  That is, the household equilibrium conditions
satisfy the invariance property.
Now consider the equilibrium conditions associated with the banks. Recall from section
4.5.2 that only private deposits,  (i.e., not ) enter the bank equilibrium conditions. The
equilibrium conditions for the case, ￿ 6= 0 are stated in (A.3). For convenience, we rewrite
the equations here, replacing  with  ¬  :








( ¬ ) + ￿ = 0 (A.5)
 :  = ()




 : ￿() = ￿￿b
￿ :  = ()

 + (1 ¬ ())










 ( ¬ ) = 
 ( +  ¬ )
The  and ￿ equations clearly satisfy the invariance property. It remains to verify that the
four equations,  
 ￿ and ￿ do so too. For given  ￿;   these four equations represent
four linear equations in the four unknowns in (A.4). We now verify that these equations
have a unique solution. With this result, our invariance property is established.
Using the ￿ equation to substitute out for 
 ¬
 in the  equation and the 
 equation
to substitute out for ￿ the remaining two equations are:










 ( ¬ ) = 
 ( +  ¬ )
Use the second of these equations to substitute out for 
 in the  equation:
 : (￿ ¬ ￿)
















68Given the value of ￿  0 in (A.6), we can now uniquely solve for ￿
 and 
 in (A.4).
The invariance property is established. Note that the invariance property applies only to the
variables in
We now turn to properties (i) and (ii) in the proposition. According to (A.6) our as-
sumption that the cash constraint is binding in the bad state, ￿  0 implies
( ¬ ) ¬ ( +  ¬ )
  0
Also, note that    according to the  equation in (A.5). As a result, for ￿xed  the
above expression is linear and decreasing in  Let  ￿ denote the value of  where the above
expression passes through zero. Note that  ￿   so that deposits,  ¬  ￿ are positive.
We can see from (A.6) that as  !  ￿ ¬￿ ! 0 That is, the cash constraint is marginally
non-binding for  =  ￿ For    ￿ the cash constraint is non-binding and ￿ = 0 This
completes the proof of the proposition.
A.3. Solving the Version of the Model with Bailouts and Leverage
We describe algorithms for solving the versions of the model studied in sections 4.5.4 and
4.5.5 in the main text. We begin with the version of the model in 4.5.4. The ￿rst order


























































































 : ¬￿p() + ￿p() + ￿￿p
0 () = 0


 : ¬￿(1 ¬ ()) + ￿(1 ¬ ())(1 + ￿) ¬ ￿￿p
0 () + ￿ = 0
￿ :  = ()

 + (1 ¬ ())(1 + ￿)





















 ( + ) = 0
Here, we assume ￿ 6= 0, so that the cash constraint is binding.
We eliminate the multipliers, ￿ and ￿ and two equations from this system. Add the 

equation to the 
 equation and solve for ￿ :
￿ =
￿ ¬ ￿













￿ + (1 ¬ ())￿￿
1 + (1 ¬ ())￿
 (A.8)
Substitute the expressions for ￿ and ￿￿b as well as the ￿ equation, into the  equation:

























































Note that when ￿ = 0 then ~ ￿ = ￿ and this equation together with the ￿ equation in (4.21)
reduces to  in (4.21).50
We must adjust the equilibrium conditions of the household to accommodate the taxes
required to ￿nance the bank bailouts. The pro￿ts, ￿ brought home by the bankers in the








+ (1 ¬ ())
￿






The representative household￿ s second period budget constraint is:
 =  + ￿ ¬ 
where  denotes the lump sum taxes required to ￿nance ￿ :
 = (1 ¬ ())￿


Substituting out for  and ￿ in the second period budget constraint,
 =  + ()
￿





+ (1 ¬ ())
￿





¬ (1 ¬ ())￿


=  + ()
 ( + ) + (1 ¬ ())








¬ (1 ¬ ())￿


=  + ()
 ( + ) + (1 ¬ ())





 + (1 + ￿)(1 ¬ ())





¬ (1 ¬ ())￿


=  + ()
 ( + ) + (1 ¬ ())
 ( + ) ¬ 




 + (1 ¬ ())
￿
( + ) (A.9)




Substitute  out using the ￿rst and second period budget constraints:
 +

() + (1 ¬ ()) =  + 
50Recall, ￿ ¬ ￿  0 because ￿;¬￿  0
70Use the intertemporal ￿rst order condition to substitute out for  so that the equilibrium








  =  ¬ 
We now collect the equilibrium conditions. Replace the  equation in (A.7), and make
use of the expressions for ￿ and ￿ to obtain the following system:
 :
￿ ¬ ￿




































￿ :  = ()

 + (1 ¬ ())(1 + ￿)




























 =  ¬ 

¬  = ￿
¬ 
where the last three equations in (A.10) are the equilibrium conditions associated with the
household. It is understood that ￿ is determined according to (4.17) and ~ ￿ according to
(A.8). In addition, the functional form for () has been used. The expressions in (A.10)






These equations reduce to (4.21) when ￿ = 0 in the case ￿ 6= 0 We solve the above equations
by solving one equation in 
Fix a value for . We now de￿ned a mapping from  into itself Fix a value for  Use





















Finally, use the ￿ equation to solve for  :















Adjust the value of  until a ￿xed point is obtained.
71We now have 

 in hand. It remains to determine a value for ￿ Substi-































































































Finally, adjust the value of  until the  equation is satis￿ed.
We now turn to the model considered in (4.5.5). Relative to the solution to (4.32) that
we just analyzed, the solution to (4.33) involves only replacing the zero in the  equation
in (A.10) with ￿ and adding ￿  = ( + ) as an additional equation. We now have 9
equations in 9 unknowns. We adapt the strategy just described to solve this model. We
solve two equations in two unknowns,  Fix values for  and solve for 
￿

in the same way as before. These calculations do not involve the  equation. Then, solve for
￿ using the modi￿ed  equation:























Finally, adjust  and  until the ￿ equation in (A.10) and ￿  = ( + ) are satis￿ed.
In e⁄ect, this solution strategy replaces the  equation with the leverage constraint as an
equality.
B. Proof of Proposition 5.3 for the Adverse Selection Model
In this appendix we prove Proposition 5.3, which underlies the reason for the assumption in
section 5 that there is an upper bound on the scale of investment projects. Proposition 5.3
addresses what happens if we instead adopt an assumption at the opposite extreme, that
investment projects have constant returns to scale without any upper bound. We show that
if there is an equilibrium in this version of the model, then it must be that all borrowing is
done by the bankers with the lowest value of  and the aggregate pro￿ts of those bankers
are zero. Thus in this equilibrium the household receives the whole marginal product of
its saving and the ￿rst best e¢ cient allocations are supported. For equilibrium to be well
de￿ned in this case we obviously require that there be positive mass on the lower bound of
72the support for  and that that lower bound be positive. Thus, we suppose that  2 [1]
where  is a very small, positive number.
Suppose a banker with a particular ￿ 2 [1] chooses to activate its project, and let
￿ denote the amount borrowed by that banker. Such a banker￿ s pro￿ts must be no less
than what it can earn by simply depositing its net worth in the bank and not borrowing
anything.51 That is, the analog of (5.5) must hold:




¬ ￿ ￿ ¬ 
￿
￿ 0 (B.1)
For each  ￿ ￿ there exists a  such that (B.1) also holds, so that bankers with  ￿ ￿
also choose to activate their projects. In equilibrium, it must be that
￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ 
￿ (B.2)
for otherwise there is no choice of  that optimizes expected banker pro￿ts.
For an interior equilibrium in which there is a positive supply of deposits to mutual funds,
it must be that   0 for some  Bankers with lower probabilities of success also borrow
positive amounts, and we conclude that in an interior equilibrium there exists a  2 [1]
such that bankers with  ￿  ￿  choose   0. For  in this interval, it must be that
￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ 
 (B.3)
for otherwise the supposition,   0 is contradicted. Let + ￿ min(￿) Combining
(B.2) and (B.3), we conclude
￿ ￿ =  for  ￿  ￿ 
+
But, this expression can only hold if + =  We conclude that in an interior equilibrium
only the bankers with the lowest probability of success operate their projects. Each of these
bankers pay  = ￿ ￿ in interest and earn zero pro￿ts ex ante. Because mutual funds are
competitive and so make zero pro￿ts,  = ￿ ￿ That is, in equilibrium households receive the
actual social marginal return on loans. As a result, the allocations in equilibrium coincide
with the ￿rst-best e¢ cient allocations. This establishes Proposition 5.3.
C. Notes on the Asymmetric Information Model
C.1. Proof that the Marginal Return Exceeds the Average Return on Loans
For convenience, we repeat the expression for the marginal return on loans, the object to
the right of the equality in (6.20), here:

 ￿ 
 f1 ¬ ￿[(￿  ()) + ( + )
0 (￿  ()) ￿ 
0 ()]g (C.1)
We wish to establish   . Here,  is the equilibrium cost of funds to mutual funds,
which we showed is also equal to the average return on loans to bankers (see (6.8)):
 = [¬(￿  ()) ¬ ￿G(￿  ())]
 ( + )

 (C.2)
51We implicitly ignore another option for the bank: deposit  in the mutual fund and then borrow from
the mutual fund and invest in the project. A property of equilibrium is that  ￿ ￿ ￿ so that no bank could
increase pro￿ts by choosing this option.
73Thus, we establish that (under a regularity condition stated below) the marginal return on
loans exceeds the corresponding average return.
In (C.2) and (C.1), ￿ () is de￿ned by (6.18) and (6.19). We reproduce these expressions
here (after substituting out for  in (6.18) using (6.19)) for convenience:
¬ 0(￿ ) ¬ ￿G0(￿ )





1 ¬ ¬(￿ )
 (C.3)
The mapping, ￿ () characterizes how ￿  changes with a change in  given the zero pro￿t
condition of mutual funds, (6.9) and the e¢ ciency condition characterizing the solution to
the banker contracting problem, (6.10). For our analysis, we require the derivative of ￿ ()
with respect to  :
￿ 
0() =
(1 ¬ ¬)(¬ 0 ¬ ￿G0)
¬ 0(¬ 0 ¬ ￿G0)( + ) + ¬ 00(¬¬ ￿G) ¬ (1 ¬ ¬)(¬ 00 ¬ ￿G00)
 (C.4)
where we have omitted the argument, ￿  in ¬ , ¬ 0 0 for notational simplicity.





( + )[1 ¬ ¬(￿ )] (C.5)
subject to

( + )[¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )] ¬  = 0 (C.6)
Letting ￿ ￿ 0 denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (C.6), the ￿rst order
conditions of the problem are:

[1 ¬ ¬(￿ )] + ￿
￿






¬ 0(￿ ) ¬ ￿G0(￿ )
 (C.8)
It is easy to verify that
¬
0(￿ ) = 1 ¬  (￿ )  0 
0 (￿ ) = ￿  (￿ )  0 (C.9)
where  (￿ ) ￿  (￿ )￿  Conditions (C.8), (C.9) and ￿ ￿ 0 imply52
￿  1 (C.10)
Solving (C.7) for ￿ and multiplying the numerator and denominator of (C.8) by ( +
)￿ 0() we obtain:
￿ =
[1 ¬ ¬(￿ )]
 ¬ [¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
 (C.11)
￿ =
( + )¬ 0(￿ )￿ 0()
( + )[¬ 0(￿ ) ¬ ￿G0(￿ )]￿ 0()
 (C.12)
52To see that ￿ ￿ 0 suppose on the contrary that ￿  0 Note that ¬(0)= (0) = 0 so that the solution
to the Lagrangian representation of the problem solved by the loan contract is  = 1 and ￿  = 0 This does
not solve the problem of maximizing (C.5) subject to (C.6) because (C.6) is violated.
74where ￿ 0() is de￿ned in (C.4).
Combining (C.11) and (C.12), we obtain the following expression for ￿:
￿ =
[1 ¬ ¬]¬ ( + )¬ 0￿ 0()
 ¬ [¬¬ ￿G] ¬ ( + )[¬ 0 ¬ ￿G0]￿ 0()
 (C.13)
where we suppress the argument, ￿  when doing so does not risk confusion. The numerator
of (C.13) consists of the numerator of (C.11) minus the numerator of (C.12). Similarly,
the denominator of (C.13) consists of the denominator of (C.11) minus the denominator of




 [¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ ) + 1 ¬ ¬(￿ )] ¬ 
( + )[¬
0(￿ ) + ￿G
0(￿ ) ¬ ¬













 [¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )] ¬ 
( + )[¬
0(￿ ) ¬ ￿G




= + (￿ ¬ 1)
￿
 ¬ 
 [¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )] ¬ 
( + )[¬
0(￿ ) ¬ ￿G




where  denotes the average return, (C.2). From (C.10), ￿  1 Hence, if the object in
braces in (C.14) is positive then    The object in braces in (C.14) is the denominator
of ￿ in (C.13). Because ￿  0, we know that the denominator is positive if the numerator of
￿ is positive. Using the expression for ￿ 0(), (C.4), we rewrite the numerator as follows:







( + )¬ 0(￿ )(1 ¬ ¬)(¬ 0 ¬ ￿G0)











This object is positive if
¬ 00(¬¬ ￿G) ¬ (1 ¬ ¬)(¬ 00 ¬ ￿G00)
( + )¬ 0(¬ 0 ¬ ￿G0)
 (C.15)
is positive. A su¢ cient condition for (C.15) to be positive is that ￿ (￿ ) is increasing in ￿ 
where (￿ ) denotes the hazard rate (see (6.22)). According to BGG, this implies that (i)
¬ 0 ¬ ￿G0  0 in equilibrium, and (ii) ¬ 000 ¬ ¬ 000  0 for all ￿ .54 Condition (i) implies
that the denominator of (C.15) is positive. The following result shows that (ii) implies the








Then, ￿ = ( + )( + )
54Condition (i) re￿ ects a combination of the result at the top of page 1382 in BGG, as well as the
observation at the top of page 1385. Condition (ii) is established on page 1382 in BGG.
75numerator of (C.15) is positive:
¬





(1 ¬ ¬)(¬ 0 ¬ ￿G0)
¬ 0(¬¬ ￿G)


















¬ 0   0
Here, the ￿rst equality uses (C.3) to substitute out for  This completes the proof of the
proposition that the marginal return on  exceeds the corresponding average return. We
state this proposition formally as follows:
Proposition C.1. Suppose that ￿ (￿ ) is increasing in ￿  Then   
C.2. Model with Curvature in the Production of Capital
Here, we introduce the modi￿cations to the model which cause the price of capital to be
endogenous and possibly be the source of a pecuniary externality. We introduce a repre-
sentative, competitive ￿rm that produces capital. Rather than building its own capital (as
we assume in the main text) the banker uses its net worth and mutual fund loan to pur-
chase capital from a representative capital producer. The following subsection describes the
problem of that ￿rm. We then derive all the model equilibrium conditions. The model is
virtually identical to the one in the main text. Still, there are some di⁄erences in notation
and so we spell out all the details at the risk of some overlap. After that, we describe the
algorithm used to compute the equilibrium. This algorithm is the basis for the calculations
discussed in the text. Finally, the last subsection describes the proposition that establishes
that a su¢ ciently large net worth transfer to bankers supports the ￿rst-best allocations.
C.2.1. Capital Producers
At the start of period 1, each banker is endowed with an equal quantity,  of capital goods.
Each banker sells its capital to capital producers and receives  =  where  is the
market price of capital in terms of the period 1 numeraire good, consumption. Here, 
denotes a banker￿ s net worth after selling its capital. In the main text (apart from section
6.5),  = 1 always, and so  =  there. The fact that  is a function of the market price,
 creates the potential for a pecuniary externality in this model
A perfectly competitive, representative capital producer operates the following produc-
tion function:

















 0     1
76Here,  denotes a quantity of investment goods, measured in units of the period 1 numeraire
good and  denotes the quantity of new capital produced by the capital producer. Pro￿ts
of the capital producer are given by:
 ¬  ¬  (C.16)
Here,  denotes the market price of new capital, in units of the period 1 numeraire good.
The representative capital producer takes prices,   as given. In an interior equilibrium,


























Combining the two ￿rst order conditions with the production function implies the capital
producer￿ s pro￿ts, (C.16), are zero.
C.2.2. Banks and Mutual Funds
The typical bank takes its net worth,  and approaches a mutual fund for a loan,  It
combines its net worth and the loan to purchase new capital:
 =  + 
In period 2 the banker uses its capital,  to produce







 () = 1
where  is the cdf of a log-normal distribution.
A representative mutual fund o⁄ers the banker a standard debt contract in period 1,
before the realization of . Under the contract, the bank pays the mutual fund an amount,
 in period 2 if it is able to do so. Bankers whose  is too low to pay  in full are
￿ bankrupt￿ . Mutual funds verify this by monitoring those bankers, at a cost of
￿!

goods, where ￿  0 is a parameter. Bankrupt banks must transfer everything they have to
their mutual fund.
The cuto⁄level of productivity, ￿  that separates the bankrupt and non-bankrupt banks
is de￿ned by:
￿ 
 =  (C.17)













 ¬ ￿ 
￿




















[ ¬ ￿ ] () = 
 (1 ¬ ¬(￿ )) (C.19)
where




An bank agrees to maximize (C.19) and remit all its pro￿ts to its household in period 2 in
exchange for perfect consumption insurance. With bankers maximizing (C.19), the household
ensures that its bankers as a group maximize the total resources available to the household
in period 2. Households can observe everything about their own member bankers (including
).
We now turn to the mutual funds. There is a large number of competitive mutual
funds, each of which makes loans to a diversi￿ed group of bankers and takes deposits from
households. Because there is no risk on the asset side of the balance sheet, it is feasible for
mutual funds to commit in period 1 to paying households a ￿xed and certain gross rate of
interest,  on their deposits in period 2. Because mutual funds are competitive, they take
 as given. A mutual fund that makes size  loans to each of a large number of banks earns
the following per bank:





Here, the term before the plus sign indicates the revenues from bankers that are not bankrupt,
i.e., those with  ￿ ￿  The term after the plus sign indicates receipts, net of monitoring
costs, from bankers that cannot pay interest,  Since the cost of funds is  the mutual
funds￿ s zero pro￿t condition is (using (C.17)):
[1 ¬  (￿ )] ￿ 










As in the main text, the interest rate paid to households is proportional to the average
return,  on loans and not, say, to the marginal return.
78Let the combinations of ￿  and  that satisfy (C.21) de￿ne a ￿ menu￿of loan contracts
that is available to bankers, for given  and 55 It is convenient to express this menu in




 [¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
 (C.22)
Bankers take  and  as given and select the contract, ( ￿ ) from this menu which
maximizes expected pro￿ts, (C.19). Using (C.22) to substitute out for  in the banker￿ s
objective, the problem reduces to one of choosing ￿  to maximize:

 1 ¬ ¬(￿ )
1 ¬ 
 [¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )]

The ￿rst order necessary condition for optimization is:
1 ¬  (￿ )
1 ¬ ¬(￿ )
=

 [1 ¬  (￿ ) ¬ ￿￿  0 (￿ )]
1 ¬ 
 [¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )]





 [¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )]





respectively. As in the text,  and  are independent of net worth, 
C.2.3. Households and Government
In period 1 the household budget constraint is:
 +  ￿  (C.23)
where ,   denote consumption, bank deposits and an endowment of output,  In the
second period, deposits generate an after tax return,
(1 + ￿) = (1 + ￿)
 [¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
where ￿ denotes a subsidy on household saving and (C.21) has been used. Total pro￿ts
brought home by a household￿ s bankers are denoted by ￿ :
￿ = 
 (1 ¬ ¬(￿ ))
Taking into account that mutual funds have zero pro￿ts, the second period budget constraint
is:
 ￿ (1 + ￿) + ￿ ¬  (C.24)




assumption that banks view  and  as parametric.
79where  denotes lump sum taxes and  denotes second period consumption. Substituting,
 ￿ (1 + ￿)
 [¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )] + 
 (1 ¬ ¬(￿ )) ¬ 
The government￿ s budget constraint is:
 = ￿ = ￿
 [¬(￿ ) ¬ ￿G(￿ )] (C.25)
If we combine the government￿ s budget constraint with the household￿ s second period budget
constraint, we obtain the second period resource constraint:
 ￿ 
 [1 ¬ ￿G(￿ )] (C.26)
which is Walras￿law in our environment. That is, period 2 consumption is no greater than
total output, net of the output used up in monitoring by banks.
The representative household maximizes
() + ￿()
subject to (C.23) and (C.24). The ￿rst order necessary and su¢ cient conditions correspond-
ing to this problem are:
0 ()
￿0 ()













We de￿ne an equilibrium as follows:
De￿nition C.2. A private sector equilibrium is a ( ￿ ) such that
(i) The household problem is solved for given ￿
(ii) The problem of the bank is solved
(iii) Mutual fund pro￿ts are zero
(iv) The problem of the capital producer is solved (see section C.2.1)
(v) The government budget constraint is satis￿ed
(vi) The ￿rst and second period resource constraints are satis￿ed.
For convenience, we collect the equations that characterize a private sector equilibrium
here. We divide these equilibrium conditions into a household block, and an bank/mutual
fund/capital producer block. The ￿rst block is:
Equation number Household Economic description
(1)  = (￿ [1 + ￿])
1
￿ household ￿rst order condition
(2)  =  [1 ¬ ￿G(￿ )] period 2 resource constraint
(3)  +  =  period 1 resource constraint
80Expression (3) is the household￿ s ￿rst period budget constraint, with  replaced with  This
replacement is possible for the following reason. Total bank assets,  can be written as
follows:
 =  +  =  + 
Here, the ￿rst equality is the banker￿ s expenditure constraint and the second equality uses
the de￿nition,  =  Zero pro￿ts for the capital producers (see section C.2.1) implies
 =  +  and the fact,
 =  (C.27)
follows.
The impact of the household and government budget constraints is completely captured
by the period 1 and period 2 resource constraints and expression (1), and so the budget
constraints are not included among the equilibrium conditions associated with the household.
The set of equilibrium conditions associated with banks, mutual funds and capital pro-
ducers is:
Equation number E¢ ciency conditions for ￿rms Economic description of condition





 [1¬(￿ )¬￿￿ 0(￿ )]
1¬ 





 [¬(￿ )¬￿G(￿ )] mutual fund zero pro￿t condition














e¢ ciency condition of capital producers












 capital accumulation technology
Equations (1)-(9) represents 9 equations in 9 private sector equilibrium objects:

 ￿ 
The equilibrium value of  can be backed out by imposing either the household or government
budget constraint. Note too that the equilibrium rate of interest on banks,  is determined
from (6.3) and the facts, (C.27),  = 
It is of interest to show that the equilibrium allocations are ￿rst-best when ￿ = 0 In this
case, equation (5) can only be satis￿ed with  =  and ￿  disappears from that equation.
Combining equations (6), (7) and (9):
1












We can think of this equation as de￿ning ￿  and, hence,  (i.e., the spread). But, this
variable does not enter the other equations, and so it plays no role in determining the
quantity allocations. The other equations are (1), (2) and (3). Expressing these with ￿ = 0


















(3)  +  =  
81where a prime indicates that the equation has been adjusted using (8) or (9). The above

















In sum, the system can be solved as follows. First, solve (1)￿and (2)￿for  and  Then,






We de￿ne the ￿rst-best problem as the problem for a planner who observes the bankers￿
realizations. Such a planner obviously does not have to pay monitoring costs. The problem
of this planner is:










Expressing this in Lagrangian form:












The ￿rst order conditions are:








0 () = ￿




















Evidently, these equations coincide with (1)￿ -(2)￿when ￿ = 0 We conclude that the equi-
librium supports the ￿rst-best consumption and investment allocations. We summarize our
￿ndings as follows:
Proposition C.3. Suppose 0    ￿ 1 When monitoring costs are zero, then the equi-
librium consumption and investment allocations coincide with the solution to the ￿rst-best
problem.
82C.2.5. Computation of Private Sector Equilibrium
Here, we describe an algorithm for computing the private sector equilibrium conditional on
an arbitrary value of ￿ Unlike in the previous subsection, in this subsection we take the
model parameters as given and compute values for the 9 model endogenous variables that





= 0. To de￿ne the mapping,  from ~  into the real line, ￿x a value for ~ 








































￿  = 






1 ¬  (1 ¬   )






Combine (1), (2) and (3):
(￿ [1 + ￿])
1
￿ = 
 [1 ¬ ￿G(￿ )]
[ ¬ ](￿ [1 + ￿])
1
￿ = 













[1 ¬ ￿G(￿ )]





 (￿ [1 + ￿])
1
￿ +  
 [1 ¬ ￿G(￿ )]

























(￿ [1 + ￿])
1
￿ 




= 0 i.e., (1) is satis￿ed.
83C.2.6. Net Worth Transfers to Bankers
Here, we consider a policy in which the government raises taxes in the ￿rst period and then
simply gives the banks the proceeds as a subsidy. With this policy, the government in e⁄ect
can cause the economy to fully circumvent the ￿nancial frictions and move to the ￿rst best
allocations.
Suppose the government raises   0 in the ￿rst period and transfers the proceeds as a
lump sum gift to banks. Let ￿ denote the ￿rst best level of investment (see (C.28)). The
optimal policy is to set  = ￿. In this case, the banks have enough net worth that they do
not need to borrow from mutual funds. In this way there are no monitoring costs.
It is easy to verify that with one exception the equilibrium conditions of the model
considered here coincide with equations (1)-(9) in section C.2.4. The only change is that the




This is the leverage ratio of the bankers and the above expression re￿ ects that with the
policy considered here, bankers￿ net worth consists of the value of the capital they are
endowed with, plus the tax transfer received from the government. If we set  =  then
leverage is unity by the zero pro￿t condition on capital producers, (C.16). But, if the left
side of (6) is unity, the right side must be too. This can be accomplished by ￿  = 0, since in
this case ¬(￿ ) =  (￿ ) = (￿ ) = 0 (see (6.7)). Equation (5) then requires  = 1 The
remaining equations coincide with the equations of the ￿rst best equilibrium, and so these
can be satis￿ed by setting  = ￿ We summarize these results as follows:
Proposition C.4. A policy of lump-sum tax ￿nanced transfers of net worth to bankers can
support the ￿rst-best allocations.










































Figure 1c: Production and Investment
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Figure 1a: Real Equity and Housing Prices
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(c) Interest rate, R
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(d) Average return on banker assets
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(f) Consumption in period 1
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(g) Consumption in period 2
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Figure 5: Optimal Subsidy Rate, in Presence of Pecuniary Externalityβ discount factor 0.97 α relative risk aversion 1 r
k return on capital 1.04
σ standard deviation 0.37 µ monitoring cost 0.2 y household's endowment 3.11
N banker's endowment 1
Table 1: Parameters of the Asymmetric Information Model
τ=0 Ramsey First best τ=0 Ramsey First best τ=0 Ramsey First best
0 0.32 − 0 1.84 − 0 1.95 −
Financial variables
(R-1)100 risk-free rate 1.00 0.98 − -5.36 -5.45 − -6.99 -7.08 −
(Z/R-1)100 spread 1.23 1.24 − 7.68 7.83 − 12.32 12.53 −
 /y net worth 0.321 0.321 − 0.161 0.161 − 0.161 0.161 −
        100 bankruptcy rate 4.00 4.03 − 20.94 21.27 − 28.95 29.35 −
L leverage ratio 2.000 2.003 − 3.434 3.466 − 3.418 3.452 −
c/y time 1 consumption 0.679 0.678 0.671 0.609 0.604 0.589 0.612 0.606 0.589
C/y time 2 consumption 0.665 0.666 0.676 0.559 0.564 0.594 0.552 0.557 0.594
(B+ )/y investment 0.642 0.643 0.650 0.551 0.556 0.571 0.549 0.554 0.571
Interest rate subsidy, 100τ
Note: (i) The columns headed `Panel A: Baseline' correspond to the baseline parameterization reported in the text. The columns headed `Panel B:
Drop in  ' correspond to the baseline parameterization with replaced by  =1/2. The columns headed `Panel C: Drop in   and rise in σ' correspond
to the baseline parameterization with  =1/2 and σ replaced the product of its value in the baseline parameterization and 1.2. (ii) The column headed `
τ=0' reports a private sector equilibrium with zero interest rate subsidy. The column headed `Ramsey' reports the Ramsey equilibrium. The column
headed `First best' reports the first best allocation.
Table 2: Properties of the Asymmetric Information Model
Panel A: Baseline Panel B: Drop in   Panel C: Drop in   and rise in σ
Real variables
) (ω F
1